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I.

A.

INTRODUCTION

General Remarks

An insurance company exists to sell complicated risk-shifting contracts, and it is rarely expected to do anything with most varieties of
insurance contracts beyond receiving the premium and issuing a document. Such a contract is aleatory: a definite performance on the side
of the insured-payment of a premium-is exchanged for a promise to
pay a. much larger sum, but only on the happening of an unlikely contingency. However, if the contingency or insured event should occur, it
is vital to the welfare of the policy-holder, and may be important to the
entire economy, that payment be made to him promptly according to his
reasonable expectations, which are based primarily on the terms of the
contract.
It was the nineteenth century viewpoint of most legal systems that a
regime of free contract was the norm, i.e., that absent compelling reasons
to the contrary, parties to contracts were to be free to negotiate about
terms and to conclude agreements with any stipulations they might wish.
Though freedom of contract is still regarded as an important value in
the twentieth century, the public authority now intervenes frequently in
the formation of contracts and places many restrictions on the freedom
of parties to bargain as they will. Such restrictions have been imposed
particularly for "contracts of adhesion," those agreements in which one
of the parties has no choice other than to adhere to the terms dictated by
the other party or reject the contract altogether. With its complicated
terms defining and qualifying a contingency on which payment will be
made, an insurance policy that is designed for mass sale to small policyholders is a classic example of a contract of adhesion. On the other
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hand, if a policyholder is an industrial giant whose bargaining power and
knowledge of the insurance market equals or exceeds that of the insurer,
an individualized contract may be negotiated. Even organizations of
policyholders sometimes develop sufficient strength to bargain with
insurers on more or less equal terms. But most insurance business,
whether measured by number of contracts or by total premium volume,
falls within the category of contracts of adhesion. It is not surprising,
therefore, that today the governments of most commercial countries
intervene frequently to affect the terms of many varieties of insurance
contracts.
The extent and manner of intervention vary remarkably from
country to country. As to extent, the Netherlands and the United
Kingdom have retained the tradition of a regime of free contract in
the insurance market. At the other extreme may be found countries
otherwise similar to Holland and England (Germany, France, and the
United States) which interfere extensively with insurance contract
terms. But in manner of intervention, there is close similarity in regulation between England and the United States, because of a common legal
tradition and method, while Holland, so far as it does intervene, follows
the pattern of its continental neighbors.
Intervention may take many forms. The legislature may create binding rules of law that override the conflicting terms of contracts, may
dictate the exact terms parties must insert in contracts, may prescribe
limits within which certain terms must lie, may prescribe the substance of
terms, or may provide terms or legal rules effective only if the parties
do not stipulate otherwise. It may also empower an administrative agency
to intervene in like manner. Intervention of a different sort-by the
judiciary-occurs in all countries, but most strikingly in the commonlaw jurisdictions, where the courts exercise significant control over freely
negotiated contract terms through the process of interpretation.
The present study' surveys the ways in which the stipulations of
the insurance contract are subjected to public control, as part of a larger
2
research project aimed at a fuller understanding of insurance regulation.
1. The basic research for the present study was done by Dr. Pfennigstorf as a
thesis for the degree of M.C.L. at the University of Michigan. It has been revised
and rewritten by the authors jointly. Thanks are expressed to the William W. Cook
Foundation for making this research possible by a fellowship grant and by other
assistance, and to the Ford Foundation, which has contributed to the later stages of
preparation of the article. Neither foundation is responsible for the views expressed,
which are solely those of the authors.
2. Related studies already published include Kimball & Hansen, The Utah Insur-

ance Commissioner: A Study of Administrative Regulation it Action (pts. 1-2), 5
UTAH L. REv. 429 (1957), 6 UTAH L. REv. 1 (1958); KIMBALL & CONKLiN, THE
MONTANA

INSURANCE

COMMISSIONER:

A STUDY OF ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION IN
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This article deals only with a part of the whole study of policy form
regulation. Though it is not possible to make a complete division of the
subject, the focus here is on the control of contract terms by legislatures
and courts, leaving regulation by administrative agencies to be considered
in a subsequent article. Both articles compare American with certain
European methods and ideas.
B.

Some Basic Ideas

1. Public and private law. In the literature of Anglo-American
law, the whole body of law is frequently classified by academic jurists
into public and private law areas, but in the common law this terminology
has only descriptive significance. Nothing of practical importance turns
on the question of whether a problem falls within one area or the other.8
In continental law the distinction has not only theoretical but also practical
importance, and the application of principles of law and the competence
of courts may depend on the classification of the problem. Ordinary
courts generally have jurisdiction over private law matters while administrative agencies, sometimes supervised by a system of administrative courts, have jurisdiction over most public law matters.' It is no
easier in continental jurisprudence than it would be in Anglo-American
to settle upon definitions of public and private law that will be satisfactory
ACTION (1960);

KIMBALL, INSURANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY (1960); Kimball & Jackson, The Regulation of Insurance Marketing, 61 COLUm. L. REv. 141 (1961) ; Kimball,
The Purposes of Insurance Regulation: A Preliminary Inquiry in the Theory of
Insurance Law, 45 MINN. L REv. 471 (1961); Kimball & Hanson, The Regulation of
Specialty Policies it Life Insurance, 62 MicH. L. REv. 167 (1963).
Though the premium is a crucial term of the contract, and though premium rate
and policy form regulation are closely related, even occasionally being performed
simultaneously, the necessities of analysis led to exclusion from this study of any
systematic consideration of rate regulation. Policy form regulation is analytically prior
to rate regulation, form being the independent and rate the dependent variable in the
relationship between them.
3. Being greatly influenced by the Roman law and modern continental writers,
HOLLAND, JURISPRUDENCE 127-34, 366-67 (13th ed. 1924) regards the distinction between
public and private law as the most important division in the law. But he recognizes
that there is "no equivalent in our insular legal terminology." Id. at 367. See also
JENKS, THE NEW JURISPRUDENCE 241-43 (1933).
AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE, Lecture XLIV (Student's ed. 1920) would give public law a relatively minor
place in the corpus juris as a branch of the Law of Persons and would even regard
much of it as merely positive morality or ethics, not as law. On the other hand,
IiRALFY, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM (3d ed. 1960) does not find it necessary even
to use the terms.
4. Thus, the Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung of Jan. 21, 1960, § 40, [1960] Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I, at 17, 21 (Ger.) specifies: "The administrative law process is
provided for all public law controversies not of a constitutional nature, unless by federal
law the controversy has been expressly assigned to another court." In German,
Privatrecht is contrasted with Offentliches Recht, and in French, droit privg with
droit public. In Europe the law of insurance regulation is a part of administrative
law, Verwaltungsrecht, droit administratif, which is the most important branch of
public law other than constitutional law.
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for all purposes,' but fortunately it is not necessary in this study to be
concerned with such niceties. For present purposes the definitions of
Enneccerus-Nipperdey are sufficient: "Public law is the law that settles
the relationships of communities, as such, to one another and to their
members," while "private law settles the legal relationships in which
individuals stand as individuals, and not as members of the community."'
Insurance law is a mixture of public and private law. On the whole
the law of the insurance contract, collected in continental Europe in
insurance contract codes but mainly contained in innumerable court
decisions in the Anglo-American system, must be regarded as private law,
while the regulation of insurance enterprises is a matter of public law.
But the line is not so clear as this generalization would suggest. When
a statute enunciates a provision respecting the insurance contract, it may
directly affect the contract, i.e., the relations between the policyholder
and the insurer, or it may not. If it directly affects the relations between
the parties to the contract, fixing or altering the terms of the contractual
relationship as they will be viewed by an ordinary court, the statute will
be classified as having private law effect. This may also be expressed
by saying that the statute is self-executing. When it creates a duty on
the part of the insurance company vis-A-vis the state, however the duty
may be sanctioned, the statute will be classified as having a public law
effect.7 It is quite possible, of course, for a statute to have both public
and private law effects. It should be noted also that action by an administrative agency, though having mainly public law effects, can have
also a direct effect on the private relations of the parties. Indeed, there
are important instances of this in insurance law.
2. lus dispositivum and ius cogens. Another classification is almost untreated in the literature of Anglo-American jurisprudence,8
though the phenomena it reflects exist in English and American law as
clearly as in the continental legal systems. If a document does not
contain all of the terms considered essential to formation of a contract,
S. See, e.g., DAHM, DEUTSCHES

RECHT 142-45 (2. Aufl. 1963); FoRSTHOFF, 1

LEHrIucH DES VERWALTUNGSRECHTS 94-107 (7. Aufl. 1958).
6. 1 ALLGEtEIN ER TEII. DES BfTRGERLICIIEN PECHTS

225-26 (15. Aufl. 1959).
The expression "as such" refers to the qualification in the next sentence, which
specifies that proprietary or non-communal relationships of communities are subject to

private law.
7. This terminology will make it easier to describe the nature of statutory intervention in the terms of insurance policies.

S. Thus,

PRAUSNITZ,

THE

STANDARDIZATION

OF

COMERCIAL

CONTRACTS

IN

ENGLISH AND CONTIENTAL LAW (1937),

is continental, though written in English.
But see Lenhoff, Optional Terms (Jus Dispositivurn) and Required Terms (Jus Cogens)
in the Law of Contracts, 45 MICH. L. REv. 39 (1946); Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 729 (1931).
LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 106-09 (1959).

See also FRIEDMANN,
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Anglo-American courts traditionally regard it as too indefinite to enforce.
To a considerable and increasing extent, however, courts have been enforcing incomplete agreements by using a rule of reason to supply the
missing terms. This is accomplished under the guise of interpretation
of contracts, the missing terms being supplied by finding "implied"
promises. Of course, such implied promises are not presumptions of
factual consent; they are judge-made rules of law applied in the absence
of agreement by the parties on the point. In theory and usually in practice
such rules of law are subject to displacement by contrary agreement, and
insurance policies are usually carefully drafted to displace all such implied
terms by explicit agreement.
In continental law, the replacement of customary or judge-made
law by codes in earlier centuries made it necessary to handle the same
problem in quite another way. A code itself is, in theory at least, a
complete and systematic statement of an entire body of applicable law,
and the various commercial codes, including the insurance contract
statutes of Germany and other states, contain numerous rules of law that
are applicable if the parties do not displace them by contrary agreement.
This "optional" or "yielding" law is the functional equivalent of the
"implied promise" of the Anglo-American law, but it is law enacted by
legislatures, not created by courts. It is ius dispositivuim, or law that can
be disposed of by the parties.
When a statute relating to contract terms is enacted in the commonlaw system, it is natural and traditional to think of it as limiting freedom-as the imposition of compulsory terms on the parties to the contract. Indeed, this was certainly the character of most such statutes in
the past. In recent decades, however, there has been a substantial trend
in the common-law system toward the use of statutes containing merely
optional terms, identifiable by language such as "unless the parties have
otherwise agreed" or "subject to special agreement." Conversely, it
has been observed9 that there is a modern tendency in the continental
system for commercial codes to contain more compulsory terms, or is
cogens, which may not be displaced by agreement of the parties, and fewer
that belong in the category of ius dispositivum. In any case, both systems now have both dispositive and compulsory statutory terms.
But it is necessary to categorize statutory restrictions in still another way, for the continental codes frequently distinguish between the
two parties to the contract, regarding one as weaker and the other as
stronger. The parties are sometimes merely forbidden to alter the statu9. Lenhoff, op. cit. supra note 8, at 40.
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tory terms to the detriment of the weaker party. In insurance, the
parties may be forbidden to make agreements inconsistent with the
statutory terms except when the alterations are for the benefit of the
policyholder. Terms that may not be changed at all for the benefit of
either party are fully compulsory or absolute terms, or absolut zwingende
Vorschriften. Nonconforming provisions are void; sometimes they may
even make the entire contract void. Which effect follows depends on
the statute's terms. Terms that may be changed for the benefit of the
policyholder or insured person but not for the benefit of the insurer are
semi- or relatively compulsory terms-relativ or halb zwingende Vorschriften.
With these classifications, it will be possible to describe the terms
of statutes somewhat more compactly and effectively and to make more
meaningful comparisons of the techniques in the various systems.
II.

A.

STATUTORY CONTROL OF POLICY TERMS IN THE UNITED STATES

Historical Background

Long before the enactment of comprehensive statutes regulating
insurance, American state legislatures began to exercise control over some
terms of insurance policy contracts.'" At a time when administrative
control was undeveloped and interference with the terms of contracts
was unusual, legislatures sometimes inserted provisions in special corporate characters that reflected overriding considerations of public policy.
An example of this is a charter granted in 1818 to the Massachusetts
Hospital Life Insurance Company by the General Court of Massachusetts,
which provided "That this corporation shall not have power to pay over
any sums to the heirs of those who shall die by the hand of justice, or
by suicide, or in consequence of a duel."" Later, general insurance
statutes were enacted, beginning with life insurance, and were directed
most often toward the protection of the policyholder against overreaching. For example, as early as 1861 a general Massachusetts statute provided for a period of grace in premium payment and for nonforfeiture
10. 1 RICHAmS, INsURANCE 149 n.10 (5th ed. 1952) erroneously states that such
control "was born out of" the Armstrong Investigation of 1905. Actually it has a
much longer history.

11. Mass. Priv. and Spec. Stat. Sess. 1817, ch. 180, § 10. Insurance corporations
were formed only by special charters until the latter part of the nineteenth century.
See KutHNL, THE WIScONSIN BusiNEss COROATION 13-18, 27-30 (1959), for discussion of the special chartering of insurance corporations in Wisconsin; for the
corresponding development elsewhere, see 2 DAvrs, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF
AmERICAN CORPORATIONS 231-47 (1914); EVAN S, BusINEss INCORPORATION IN THE
UNITED STATES 1800-1943, at 10-30 (1948); DODD, AmERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS
UNTIL 1860, at 218-26, 292-309 (1954).
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in case of default." The failure of many companies during the depression
of the 1870's stimulated the growth of the regulatory systems of New
York and Massachusetts; statutes were enacted and provided, in part, for
periods of grace for premium payment, nonforfeiture and cash surrender values. 8 These statutes did not introduce ideas of fairness which
had originated with the legislators; 'ather they imposed standards voluntarily assumed by more liberal companies upon enterprises whose practices were less generous.' In that way the statutes not only protected
the interests of the policyholders, but also the interests of established
companies against threatened unfair competition.'" These important
and pathbreaking statutes dealt only with specific problems, however.
Fire insurance was the first line of insurance to receive systematic
attention; this occurred in the 1870's and 1880's and led to a standard
policy form.' As a result of New York's Armstrong investigation, a
substantial amount of legislative activity developed about 1906-1910
affecting life insurance policy terms; it was similar in nature but more
far-reaching than that of the 1870's.' Abuses similar to those discovered
in life insurance brought about an investigation by the National Convention of Insurance Commissioners (NCIC) into accident and health
insurance in 1910. The investigation led to enactment of state statutes
based on an elaborate model bill prepared by the NCIC, which required
inclusion of certain standard provisions in each policy.' In other lines
of insurance, there has been somewhat less intervention, though there
is a good deal of variation in the extent of regulation from state to state.
From the beginning of the development of American insurance laws,
imitativeness played an important role so that patterns of legislation
12. Mass. Gen. Laws 1861, ch. 186. See also Michaelson & Goodridge, Filing and
Approval of Policy Forms, in 6 EXAMINATION OF INSURANCE COMPANIES 367, 368
(N.Y. State Ins. Dep't ed. 1955).
13. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1876, ch. 341; N.Y. Sess. Laws 1877, ch. 321; N.Y. Sess.
Laws 1879, ch. 347; Mass. Laws 1880, ch. 232; McCall, A Review of Life Insurance,
in INSURANCE, A TEXT Boon 9, 21 (Fricke ed. 1898) (President of New York Life
Insurance Company).
14. AMRHEINT, THE LIBERALIZATION OF THE LIFE INSURANCE CONTRACT 57-58 (1933).
For company lobbying as a factor, see KELLER, THE LIFE INSURANCE ENTERPRISE

1885-1910, at 214-26 (1963).
15.
16.

See MOWBRAY & BLANCHARD, INSURANCE 492 (5th ed. 1961).

See notes 53-59 infra and accompanying text.

17. AMRHEIN, op. cit. supra note 14, at 50; Rhodes, Recent Insurance Legislation,
in 10 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ACTUARIAL SOCIETY OF AMERICA 145 (1907-1908).
18. MOWBRAY & BLANCHARD, op. cit. supra note 15, at 501-02. Some states were

already feeling their way to statutory control over disability policy terms. See, e.g.,
KIMBALL, INSURANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 233 (1960) for Wisconsin developments. In
1957 the Uniform Individual Accident and Sickness Policy Provisions Law, as adopted
in 1950 by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, was in effect in 45
jurisdictions. 1957 NAIC PROCEEDINGS II, at 330.
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tended to move across the country in waves. But this was a uniformity
without design; a deliberate effort to create a uniform approach to
insurance legislation began with the formation of the National Convention of Insurance Commissioners (NCIC or NAIC) in 1871."9 Drafting model bills has long been a principal activity of the NAIC, but
despite its activity, the statute books of the states now present a varied
picture. In all jurisdictions insurance controls are partly legislative-at
least there is always a statutory standard fire policy. Usually there are
standard provisions for accident and sickness insurance as well. In some
instances, legislative control has been supplemented by a general administrative approval requirement applicable to all types of insurance
policies.2" In other states, administrative control, if any, has been less
comprehensive, applying only to some kinds of policies. These administrative controls have developed quite independently for the different
kinds of insurance, and the degree of systematization varies greatly from
state to state. Some policies need only be "filed for information" with
the insurance department, while others need formal approval by the
commissioner. Still others must conform to statutory requirements but
need no special administrative approval. Even provisions based on NAIC
model bills are not always uniform, for states depart freely from the
models.2 ' Moreover, the model bills are not all consistent with one
another; each reflects the thinking of the time of its development and
is not completely compatible with provisions conceived at another time. 2
Throughout the century since policy form control began to develop, the interest of the representatives of the public in the terms of the
insurance contract has steadily increased. Today not only has the
legislature itself interfered substantially with insurance policy terms, but
it has also given significant power to the insurance commissioner to
intervene. On the whole, in the American insurance market, the insurance
contract is under virtually complete public control.
19. The National Convention of Insurance Commissioners became the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners in 1936. It is referred to here as NCIC or
NAIC, according to date. The Armstrong revelations led to a conference of governors,
attorneys general and insurance commissioners called by President Theodore Roosevelt.
The so-called "Committee of Fifteen" emerged from that conference and was assigned
the duty of preparing uniform requirements for policy forms. See BULEY, THE AmERIcAN LIFE CONVENTION 264-66 (1953).
More recently, draft proposals for uniform
laws have been prepared by Committees of the NAIC.

20. E.g., MIcH. INS. CODE § 2236 (1956).
21.

Purvis, Comity and Uniformity in State Insurance Regulation, in 1953 ABA

SECTION oF INSuRANcE LAW PROCEEDINGS 136.
22. Some notion of the complexity of legislative development, even in a single
state, may be gained from KImBALL, op. cit. supra note 18, at 230-40.
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B.

The Preparationand Enactment of Statutes

A comparison of American with European control of policy forms
requires attention to some features of the legislative process in each
jurisdiction. In some American states the Insurance Commissioner now
has an important position in the legislative process that was acquired only
gradually. While in 1886 it could be asserted that the New York Superintendent of Insurance was no better qualified to draft a standard fire
policy form "than an Egyptian mummy of the Second Dynasty,"23 now
he conducts annually a hearing in which legislative bills of the department and proposals made by the industry are discussed by department
and industry representatives. The Superintendent's annual report to the
legislature contains a special section devoted to proposed legislation
which, in a recent year, disclosed that the department was sponsoring
33 measures before the legislature. Sometimes the department conducts
research programs lasting for years.24 In addition to its part in the initiation of legislation, the New York department exercises considerable
influence during legislative deliberation. The insurance committee customarily asks the department's opinion on all bills touching insurance
questions, and the governor, before signing the bill, normally asks for a
memorandum. On the other hand, in many other states, including some
large ones, the department still has no staff members really qualified to
perform adequately the task of bill drafting.
The legislative position of the individual insurance departments,
even of those lacking qualified personnel, is strengthened through cooperation with the industry and the NAIC, which has developed into
an effective workshop for uniform legislation. 5 As a merely voluntary
association of state officials, the NAIC has no official power and acts
only through its member commissioners. Nevertheless, its bill-drafting
23.

Kennedy, Origin of the Standard Fire Insurance Policy, in THE FIRE

ANCE CONTRACT, ITS HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION

INsUR-

20, 24 (Ins. Soc'y of N.Y. ed. 1922).

See also Goble, The Moral Hazard Clauses of the Standard Fire Insurance Policy,
37 COLUm. L. REv. 410 (1937).

24. N.Y. 103RD PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF INSURANCE TO
THE NEW YORK LEGISLATURE COVERING THE CALENDAR YEAR 1961, at 118-28. For a
research program, see REPORT OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF INSURANCE TO THE 1958
LEGISLATURE FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR 1957, at 17-21.
25.

Its first effort was a uniform standard provisions bill for accident and health

Follmann, Regulation of Accident and Sickness Insurance, in ACCIDENT
INSURANCE 234-38 (McCahan ed. 1954); Michaelson & Goodridge,
supra note 12, at 370. See also note 18 supra and accompanying text.
The NAIC has participated in the preparation of other model acts, including one
shaped during revision of the New York Standard Policy of fire insurance in 19131917 and in 1939-1943. See text at notes 64-68 infra. The New York form served as a
model for the other states, but it is not only with respect to policy form that the NAIC
prepares model laws. See, e.g., DRaFT UNAUTHORIZED INSURERS FALSE AD vERTiSING
PROCESS ACT, 1960 NAIC PROCEEDINGS I, at 151-52.
insurance.
AND

SICKNESS
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activities have been spectacularly successful when compared to the similar
work of the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
For example, the new Uniform Individual Accident and Sickness Policy
Provisions Law, recommended by the NAIC in 1950, had been adopted
in 45 states by 1957."
Various factors contribute to the legislative success of the NAIC.
Protracted deliberation based on investigations, questionnaires sent to the
state insurance departments, and research done in the larger departments
is followed by hea~ings at which industry representatives testify. Drafts
are sent to all commissioners and interested companies, and are reviewed
in the light of the criticisms received. For example, the 1950 Uniform
Individual Accident and Sickness Policy Provisions Law was a product
of "three years of cooperative effort by [the NAIC] Accident and
Health Committee and representatives of the Bureau of Accident and
Health Underwriters, the Health and Accident Underwriters Conference,
and other industry representatives. '""r Such elaborate preparation is
uncommon in American legislative activity at the state level.28 Another
factor in the success of the NAIC is a common interest of states and the
NAIC in pressing vigorously for legislation; that often provides a
motive for insurance department cooperation. Since 1945, the fear of
federal intervention in case of inadequate state regulation has often
been a powerful incentive to prepare and adopt uniform laws that are
thought to be adequate to forestall federal insurance legislation.2 9
The extent and manner of industry participation in the legislative
process varies from state to state. While the testimony of industry
representatives in New York is heard routinely by the Insurance Department before a legislative bill is drafted and by the legislative committee,"0
as recently as 1959 the president of the NAIC felt it necessary to recommend that the industry be given notice of planned legislation, and that
hearings or conferences be conducted before enacting new laws."' It
may be doubted whether his concern was justified; the associations of
insurers with staffs created for the purpose are active and self-activating
26. 1957 NAIC PROCEEDINGS II, at 330.
27. Follmann, supra note 25, at 234 n.5.
28. Of course, it is not this factor but others that distinguishes insurance legislation from that of the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
29. Section 2(b) of the McCarran Act provides that the Sherman, Clayton and
Federal Trade Commission Acts "shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the
extent that such business is not regulated by State Law." 59 Stat. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1012(b) (1952).
30. See, e.g., Note, What the Legislators Are Doing, 1958 INs. L.J. 69, 110.
31.

1959 NAIC PROCEEDINGS I, at 40.
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participants in the law-making process. 2 Even so, something might be
gained by formalizing and legitimating industry participation in the
legislative process, however, as legitimacy is a powerful incentive to responsibility. Besides participation in preparatory stages, the insurance
industry also engages extensively in lobbying,3" including the use of
threats of withdrawal from the state. Occasionally, but not often, such
threats have been carried out."
As yet no state has provided for formal and institutionalized participation of policyholders in the legislative process, perhaps because no
strong association of policyholders for the protection and representation
of their common interests had ever been formed until recent concern
over threatened surplus lines legislation led to formation of the Insurance
Consumers Subcommittee of the Unauthorized Insurance Committee of
NAIC 5 Nevertheless, policyholders' views and interests can influence
legislation through lawsuits, the decisions of which may induce legislative action, through a large volume of complaints to the insurance
department, leading to recommendations to the legislature, or through
the fact that legislators are often policyholders or legal counsel for
policyholders.
Some other groups have participated occasionally in insurance lawmaking. Brokers and agents were involved in the revisions of the New
32. See, e.g.,

GLENN,

in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
AMERICA 87, 88 (1958).

Association's 1958 State Legislative and Legal Activities,

52 D ANNUAL

MEETING OF LIFE INSURANCE AssOCIATIoN OF

33. The proceedings of the various trade associations tell an eloquent story of involvement in legislative matters. A less direct, but perhaps even more telling, indication
of such activity is reflected in the Wisconsin statute, which now requires, as a prerequisite for obtaining a license in the field of life insurance, an exact account of lobbying
expenses, contributions to political parties, and other activity in the field of legislation.
Wis. Stat. §§ 206.46-47 (1961).
34. See KIMBALL, op. cit. supra note 18, at 243.
35. In 1960, during hearings by a committee of the NAIC on problems of the nonadmitted market, it was called to the attention of the committee chairman that insurance buyers were unrepresented; he responded by an invitation to form an insurance
consumers advisory subcommittee. A group of nineteen representatives of corporate
insurance buyers met in Chicago on September 25, 1960, to review the NAIC activity.
This group grew to 150 by December. In order to make the subcommittee more
representative, the American Society of Insurance Management was asked to take it
over. The latter organization was formed as a national organization in 1950, though
there was a predecessor organization with origins in the 1930's. It now has 30 state
chapters and approximately 1350 members. Obviously, it is representative mainly of
large corporate buyers of insurance, though its spokesmen claim more. Statement of
Robert S. Gyory, Chairman, Subcommittee for Nonadmitted Insurance, American
Society of Insurance Management, in Hearings on S. Res. 56 (Part 11 Surplus Lines
Insurance) Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Continittee on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 6370-74 (1963); Address by Charles H.
Groves, New York Joint Legislative Committee on Insurance Rates and Regulation,
Oct. 3, 1962; Address by Raymond A. Severin, American Management Association
in New York, May 8, 1961.
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York Standard Fire Policy in 1913 and 1939-1943,8" and as early as
1927 the American Bar Association approved a "Draft of Statutory
Provisions relating to the Business of Insurance.""7 It is interesting that,
unguided by institutionalized procedures, such participation has had no
significant effect.
The kind of preparation that goes into NAIC model or uniform bills
is unusual in the state legislative process, as is the sophisticated preparatory activity of the New York Insurance Department. Typically,
there is a casual lack of concern for the niceties of professional technique.
Bills are hastily drafted by persons unskilled in the insurance field and
in legislative drafting and are then freely modified by legislators who
display little regard for the inconsistencies thus introduced into the law,
but respond instead to pressures or even to mere suggestions from constituents protecting their special interests. Ultimately a large number of
insurance bills become law and contribute to a chaotic melange of legislation, often called, out of courtesy, an "insurance code." The typical
American "insurance code" has grown up as a patchwork of measures
put together without regard for the virtues of systematic thought. 8
Fortunately there is a contemporary effort in many states to correct
some of the worst of the deficiencies thus created, but it faces considerable difficulties not unlike those that created the problem in the first
instance. The contrast with the best of the European legislation is
striking.
C.

Legislative Control of Contract Terms

Especially in earlier years, various constitutional objections were
raised against legislative intervention in insurance policy terms. The
earliest constitutional objection was that the statute infringed freedom
of contract. Indeed, as late as 1894 an insurance man would say that
"when it is asserted that the internal management and the manifold
details of the business of a private corporation may be regulated by
36.

Rumsey, The New Standard Fire Insurance Policy of the State of New York,

in THE FIR INSURANCE CONTRACT, ITS HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION 41, 42 (Ins.

Soc'y of N.Y. ed. 1922) ; 3 RIcHARms, INSURANCE 1589 (5th ed. 1952).
37. 1927 A.B.A. REP. 281. The draft went to insurance companies and commissioners, and the NCIC appointed a special committee, but the two committees were unable
to conduct joint meetings. 1928 A.B.A. REP. 402; 1930 A.B.A. REP. 440. The National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws also failed to cooperate. Ibid.
Kansas adopted some parts of the draft, and it was unsuccessfully introduced in Congress

for the District of Columbia. 1928 A.B.A. REP. 402; 1929 A.B.A. REP. 344; 1931
The draft was not introduced in any other legislature. 1932
A.B.A. REP. 488.
A.B.A. REP. 394.

38. The developments documented in detail in KIMBALL, op. Cit. supra note 18,
seem amply to support these generalizations. If further proof is needed, reading one
or two American insurance codes selected at random will supply it.
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Statute, the protection of our form of government is menaced and
socialism uprears its head.""9 Such arguments were not often successful
in overturning statutes. Occasionally, however, a court has found that the
state legislature exceeded the broad reach of the police power, as limited
in state constitutional provisions. For example, in 1946 the Kentucky
Supreme Court held that a statutory provision making it unlawful for
a life insurance policy to provide for payment of the insured sum to an
undertaker specifically named in the policy was in violation of the
Kentucky Constitution on the ground that the stated purpose of the
statute-to avoid unreasonable restraint of competition between undertakers-was an objective serving only the private interests of a few
individuals, and was beyond the reasonable and legitimate interest of the
state.4
Most statutes seek to achieve control over the substantive terms of
the insurance contract so that the insured may enter a "reasonable" and
"equitable" contract. 1 Such statutes will be the subject matter of most
of the discussion in this paper. But there are some provisions which
are designed to regulate only the form of the contract. They exist to
protect the policyholder from deception by giving him access to full
information about his coverage. Still other statutory provisions are
aimed at developing a procedural mechanism for enforcing the substantive or formal provisions.
1. Formal and Procedural Requirements.
a. Formal requirements. In the United States, most insurance
codes require that policies in certain kinds of insurance, in particular in
life and disability insurance, "contain the entire contract." They may
operate directly42 or by requiring the insertion in the policy of a special
provision to the same effect;43 it is quite common, though hardly
necessary, for an insurance code to contain both kinds of statute." The
39. Address by Mr. George Sanderson, in
ASSOCIATION OF THE NORTiwEST 40

(1894).

PROCEEDINGS,

FIRE UNDERWRITERS'

40. Kenton & Campbell Benevolent Burial Ass'n v. Goodpaster, 304 Ky. 233, 200
S.W.2d 120 (1946). Contra, Metropolitan Funeral Sys. Ass'n v. Forbes, 331 Mich. 185,
49 N.W.2d 131 (1951).
41. By a "reasonable" contract is meant one whose terms treat the whole body of
policyholders properly. See Kimball, The Purposes of Insurance Regulation: A Prelininary Inquiry in the Theory of Inrurace Law, 45 MINN. L. REv. 471, 490 (1961).
By an "equitable" contract is meant one that does not improperly classify or fail to

classify policyholders. Id. at 491.
42. E.g., N.Y. INS. LAW § 142(1) (enacted in N.Y. Laws 1906, ch. 326, § 16).
43. E.g., N.Y. INS. LAW § 155(2), enacted in N.Y. Laws 1909, ch. 301. For a short
period New York seems to have had only the direct-effect statute.
44. E.g., N.Y. INS. LAW § 142 (life, accident, health) and, 155 (c) ; MIcH. INS.
CODE §§ 4004, 4014 (1956).
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"entire policy provision" is usually accompanied by a provision directing
that a copy of the application be attached to and made a part of the policy,
if it is to be admissible in evidence.4" These rules have a double function.
First, they seek to ensure that the prospective policyholder receives full
information about his rights and duties from a single document and its
attachments, and that nothing can be made part of the agreement by
reference, without being fully quoted in the policy. This function of
providing information and assurance will be termed the formal function.
The second consequence, no less important, is one of substantive law.
The impact of the old common-law representations, which were statements
made outside the policy, is eliminated,4" as no representation by the
policyholder can any longer adversely affect his coverage in a judicial
proceeding unless it is formally made a part of the policy.
In a second group of formal requirements are provisions enumerating certain subjects which must be covered in the policy to prevent
it from being misleading to an uninformed or naive policyholder. An
example is the New York law requiring life insurance contracts to
contain a "statement as to principal amount of insurance, the entire
money and other consideration therefor, the time at which the insurance
thereunder takes effect and terminates, the period of grace, if any, for
payment of premiums, lapsation and cancellation, duties and obligations
of the assured, (and) the right to arbitration, if any.

.

.

.

If the

content of such clauses is specified by statute, they would be classed
as substantive provisions, not formal requirements. For example, the
life insurance standard provisions laws customarily require a provision
giving a period of grace of 30 days, a month or some similar period.48
In the same sense, the standard nonforfeiture law is partially formal,
for considerable freedom remains in the company to determine the figures
to be inserted in the statutory clauses. The company is compelled only
to give the policyholder precise information about the benefits to which
he is entitled."9 This serves to emphasize the formal aspect of all requiredprovisions laws, as contrasted with laws that have direct effect only;
while both give the policyholder rights, only the former class of laws
helps to inform him of his rights. This combination of form and sub45.

E.g., N.Y. INS. LAW §

142.

46. Kimball, Warranties, Representationsand Concealment in Utah Insurance Law,
4 UTAH L. REv. 456, 468-77 (1955), discusses the complexities of interpreting these
statutes, especially where they overlap in coverage and are not precisely the same in
effect.
47. N.Y. INs. LAW § 408(2) (dealing with insurance of life of property). See
also MICH. INS. CODE §§ 2226-32.
48. See text accompanying note 86 infra.
49. N.Y. INs. LAW § 208-a.
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stance, with a dual purpose of giving the policyholder rights and informing him of them, is seen most clearly in the New York requirement that
an accident and sickness policy contain, "prominently printed on the
first page thereof or .

.

. attached thereto a notice . . . that during

a period of ten days from the date the policy is delivered to the policyholder, it may be surrendered to the insurer together with a written
request for cancellation of the policy and in such event the insurer will
refund any premium paid therefor. .-.
Finally, certain statutory requirements are formal in the strictest
sense. They provide that the policy must show the name of the insurer,
that it must be printed legibly in type of at least a certain minimum size,
that certain clauses must be printed in bold face, that exclusions and
limitations shall be printed with no lesser prominence than benefits or
that there shall be a special unmistakable notice of any limted character
of the policy. 5 The objective of all these clauses is to protect the prospective policyholder from being confused or misled. Although they have
given rise to some litigation, they do not present questions deserving
exhaustive consideration in this study.
b. Procedural requirements. Procedural requirements aid in
enforcement of the substantive requirements. A filing or approval requirement is useful in ascertaining that the companies comply with
statutes, even when a statute gives little or no discretion to the commissioner, and of course, an approval procedure is indispensable if a statute
allows him more freedom for decision. Since the interesting questions
respecting approval arise only when the commissioner exercises discretion,
this subject will be dealt with in connection with administrative control
over policy forms."
2. Substantive requirements. Statutory provisions having effect
on the substantive content of insurance contracts have greatly varying
character: A complete policy may be prescribed, or only a part of one.
Individual terms may be prescribed, prohibited or made optional. All
of these may require literal or only substantial compliance. Some of
these variations will now be considered.
a. The statutory standard policy and its implementation. Statutory prescription of every word of an insurance contract is both the most
N.Y. INs. LAw § 164(2) (B) (8).
51. See, e.g., N.Y. INs. LAW, § 164(2) (B) (4) (accident and health insurance).
A requirement that policy forms bear an identifying number seems to serve merely
administrative convenience in facilitating control, and thus to be procedural rather
than formal in the sense of the classification used here. N.Y. INs. LAW § 164(2) (B) (6).
52. See article referred to in the text following note 2 supra.
50.
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substantial and the most inflexible interference with freedom of contract
that may be found in the insurance market. It has an important place in
American control of insurance contract terms, both historically and at the
present time. Theoretically, the statutory standard policy could be either
fully or semi-compulsory; in practice it has generally been fully compulsory in American systems.
i. The standard fire insurance policy. Though unfair
treatment of policyholders is perhaps the most important motive behind
the regulation of policy terms, it apparently was not what first moved
a legislature to prescribe a standard fire policy.5" The evil that prompted
legislative action, in New York at least, 4 was a more technical one:
the diversity of the policies issued by different insurers, which led to
serious difficulty in the settlement of claims in cases involving multiple
insurers. The industry appreciated the need for uniformity before any
legislature did; as early as 1867 the National Board of Fire Underwriters
became interested in uniformity,"3 and the New York Board of Fire
Underwriters produced a policy which was adopted by many of its
member companies. Unfortunately not all adopted it and some did so
only with amendments. Voluntary uniformity apparently being impossible, some sentiment developed within industry circles for enforced
uniformity, and an industry-drafted bill was unsuccessfully introduced in
the legislature. But even so, when two large fires, affecting one senator
as owner and another as legal counsel, stimulated them to press for a
uniform policy, there was official industry opposition to passage of the
particular bill, because it delegated power to draft the policy to the
53. Large insureds, at least, were quite able to defend themselves against unfair
policy conditions. Kennedy, supra note 23, at 21-22, reports action by commission merchants who succeeded, after joint cancellation of 84 policies, in forcing an insurer to
remove a newly introduced exclusion clause. Of course, not all policyholders were in
such a good position. In many cases exclusions and limitations of coverage, introduced
to fight unwarranted claims and undue extensions of coverage, were abused in rejecting
een well-founded claims of honest policyholders. See also Shaver, Pitfalls in Insurance
Policies, 1950 ABA PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECTION ON INsuRAxc LAW 55; Crichton, The
Statutory Fire Insurance Policy, 1951 ABA PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECTION ON INSURANCE
LAW

131.

54. New York's standard fire policy law was not the first, but it is the one about
the origins of which the most is known, probably because it was the one that became

the model for other states. It was enacted by N.Y. Laws 1886, ch. 488, § 1. Conn.
Laws 1867, ch. 121 enacted a standard policy law long before New York; it was repealed
by Conn. Laws 1868, ch. 8, no policy having been issued under it. See Crichton, supra

note 53, at 131. AURHEIN, op. cit. supra note 14, at 54, assumes that legislative action
was taken so early in fire insurance because there were more important limitations on

coverage there than in life insurance. Perhaps a more likely explanation is that fire
insurance was already of vital importance in America society, while life insurance

was not as yet. Massachusetts had a much earlier statute than did New York, but

of a different type. See note 60 infra. The Michigan statute also preceded the New
York one. See note 59 infra.

55. AmIHEiN, op. cit. supra note 14, at 54.
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Superintendent."8 The ultimate result was a compromise; the Superintendent was authorized to draft a standard fire policy form unless,
within a limited period, the New York Board of Fire Underwriters
should file one.5" After six months of assiduous labor, the Board's committee submitted its policy which thereupon became the official standard
policy. Neither the legislature nor any policyholders had any part in
shaping its terms; it was entirely an industry-prepared document. The
primary aim of the policy seems to have been uniformity, though the
circumstances of its preparation suggest that "reasonableness" must also
be counted among its objectives,"8 even if that goal was scarcely achieved,
judging from twentieth century standards. Enacted prior to the New
York statute, the Michigan Act of 1881 had more elaborately stated
objectives, which explicitly included ideas of justice, in addition to the
technical objectives of the New York statute. 9
Nearly all subsequently drafted standard fire policies of other
states, whether prepared by legislatures or by insurance commissioners,
relied heavily on the New York form." Some of the early statutes
adopted the sensible expedient of delegating the technical and complicated
task of drafting the actual contract to an insurance commissioner or
administrative body. But this eminently appropriate division of labor
in the body politic caused the authorizing statutes to be declared unconstitutional by some state courts as an improper delegation of legislative
power. The doctrine was first enunciated in Pennsylvania in 1895 and
then spread quickly across the country, affecting even states where
56. Kennedy, supra note 23, at 22-24.
57. N.Y. Laws 1886, ch. 488, § 1. See also PATTERsoN, THE INSURANCE COauISSIONER IN THE UNITED STATES 249 (1927).
58. For the meaning of "reasonable," see note 41 supra.
59. It authorized a special commission to prepare a standard policy form which
shall be so worded and printed
as to secure as far as practicable the accomplishment of the following results,

viz.:

First, Fairness and equity between the insurers and the assured;
Second, Brevity and simplicity;
Third, The avoidance of technical words and phrases;
Fourth, The avoidance of conditions, the violation of which by the assured
would, without being prejudicial to the insurer, render the policy void or voidable
at the option of the insurer;
Fifth, The use of as large and fair type as is consistent with a convenient
size of paper or parchment;
Sixth, The placing of each separate condition in a separate paragraph, and
the numbering of the paragraphs.
Mich. Pub. Acts 1881, No. 149, § 2.
60. By 1913 about thirty states had adopted it, sometimes with modifications.
3 RICHARDs, INSURANCE 1589 (5th ed. 1952).
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the courts had previously expressly recognized a statute as valid." The
legislatures responded directly by enacting the existing standard policy
forms in statutory form. These laws were upheld by the courts.6" Since
that time, standard fire policy forms have continued to be formally
enacted by legislatures though current constitutional doctrine is more
liberal. 2 Only such an extraneous consideration as this can justify the
ponderous and pontifical enactment of the detailed provisions of a
complicated and intricate contract.
In the course of time, the 1886 New York Standard policy came to
be regarded widely as a technical and illiberal document which treated
policyholders with unseemly harshness. 4 The 1913 New York legislature
directed the Insurance Superintendent to request that the NCIC appoint
61. King v. Concordia Fire Ins. Co., 140 Mich. 258, 103 N.W. 616 (1905);
Anderson v. Manchester Fire Assur. Co., 59 Minn. 182, 63 N.W. 241 (1895); Nalley
v. Home Ins. Co., 250 Mo. 452, 157 S.W. 769 (1913); O'Neil v. American Fire Ins.
Co., 166 Pa. 72, 30 At. 943 (1895) ; Phenix Ins. Co. v. Perkins, 19 S.D. 59, 101 N.W.
1110 (1905); Dowling v. Lancashire Ins. Co., 92 Wis. 63, 65 N.W. 738 (1896). The
Wisconsin Supreme Court had previously assumed the statute to be valid in Bourgeois v.
Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 86 Wis. 606, 57 N.W. 347 (1893), as had the Minnesota
court in an earlier stage of Anderson v. Manchester Fire Assur. Co., 60 N.W. 1095
(Minn. 1894). In general, see PATTERSON, op. cit. supra note 57, at 250-56.
62. Re Opinion of Justices, 97 Me. 590, 592, 55 Atl. 828 (1903); Att'y General
ex rel. Michigan Lubricator Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 148 Mich. 566, 112 N.W. 132
(1907), upholding Mich. Acts 1905, No. 277. The Wisconsin Legislature anticipated
invalidation of the earlier statute and enacted the standard policy in statutory form
before the court had rendered its opinion. KImBALL, INSURANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY
231 (1960).
63. See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 71 Colo. 495, 208 Pac. 465
(1922); State ex tcl. Martin v. Howard, 96 Neb. 278 (1914). In 1928 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court said in dictum that Dowling v. Lancashire Ins. Co., 92 Wis. 63, 65 N.W.
738 (1896) would have to be decided differently if it came up again. State ex rel.
Wisconsin Inspection Bureau v. Whitman, 196 Wis. 472, 505, 220 N.W. 929, 941 (1928).
See PATTERSON, op. cit. supranote 57, at 255-56.

64. For a particularly devastating analysis, see Goble, supra note 23.
judge thought that the

One

basis of the policy seems to be an assumption that every man who insures his
property is necessarily a rogue, and will undertake to cheat the company, and
that the poor, honest companies must be protected against the villainy of the
people who pay their money and get insurance.
It seems to be framed in the interest of dishonest companies and insurance
brokers, and puts an honest insurance company and honest officers of a company
at a very great disadvantage. . . .
O'Neil v. American Fire Ins. Co., 166 Pa. 72, 74 (1895). For a classic diatribe against
an earlier insurance policy, see De Lancey v. Rockingham Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,
52 N.H. 581, 587 (1873). But as late as 1910, a legislative committee, after investigation
of the business of fire insurance in New York, found nothing objectionable in the
standard fire policy and recommended no changes save those proposed by the companies.
I REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF THE SENATE AND ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF
NEW YORK APPOINTED TO INVESTIGATE CORRUPT PRACTICES IN CONNECTION WITH
LEGISLATION, AND THE AFFAIRS OF INSURANCE COMPANIES OTHER THAN THOSE DOING
LIFE INSURANcE BUSINESS 128 (1911).
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a committee to revise the standard policy.65 After much work had been
done cooperatively by various insurance departments and insurance
companies, a new form was completed and subsequently adopted in
New York and a substantial number of other states.66 Comparison of the
1918 policy with the older form demonstrates the impact of the notions
of the twentieth century; the new document favored the policyholder
more and constituted a more "reasonable" contract. Though the influence
of the insurance industry was still substantial, participation in the drafting by public representatives was more significant. Even this contract
had its unreasonable elements-especially the continued existence of
moral hazard conditions that might easily result in the loss of protection
because of an unimportant and merely technical violation by the insured. 7
Continued criticism of the illiberality of the standard policy led the NAIC
to adopt and recommend a revision of the 1918 form which had much
more generous terms; its "reasonableness" seems beyond question.
More recently, critics have urged that the standard policy system be
abandoned in fire insurance in favor of a system of standard provisions
that leaves room for variation and development. 8
All states of the United States currently have laws prescribing a
fire policy and forbidding insurers to issue any other form;" almost all
statutes are based upon the New York Standard Policy of 1943.70 The
law does permit riders or endorsements providing for certain extended
coverage, which must not be in conflict with the terms of the standard
policy and which are usually subject to the commissioner's approval.7
Sometimes the statutes detail limits within which the endorsements must
be framed. The Michigan law, for example, prescribes that the business
interruption coverage endorsement must be limited to a twelve month
indemnity, and that the sum to be paid must be based upon the average
65. MOWBRAY & BLANCHARD, op. cit. suPra note 15, at 98, state this without providing any sources of information. They also maintain that a more liberal California
revision of the 1886 standard policy led to the agitation for revision of the form.
66. N.Y. Laws 1917, ch. 440, § 3. See PATTERSON, op. cit. supra note 57, at 249,
462-63; 3 RIcHARDs, INSURANCE 1589 (5th ed. 1952).
67. Goble, supra note 23.
68. Crichton, supra note 53, at 137-38.
69. The Massachusetts legislature preceded that of New York with a standard fire
policy form enacted in 1873, but the standard form it set forth was not made compulsory.
Forms that differed even to the disadvantage of the insured were permitted after filing
with the insurance commissioner, whose only duty was to note the variations from the
standard form and, upon request, to communicate them to interested persons. Thus, the
Massachusetts law was merely dispositive and not even semi-compulsory. Mass. Gen.
Laws 1873, ch. 331. N.H. Laws 1885, ch. 93, § 3 followed the dispositive pattern of
Massachusetts.
70. 3 RicHArs, INSURANcE 1589-91 (5th ed. 1952).

71. E.g., N.Y.

INS. LAw

§ 168(5).
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business experience for the previous twelve months.7 2 Perhaps such
specific and inflexible prescriptions should not be surprising, since the
endorsements are intended to modify a contract prescribed by statute
in its smallest detail.
ii. The standard life insurance policy. Much legislative
concern has been expressed for the terms of the life insurance contract.
Though it was by no means the beginning of such control, New York's
Armstrong investigation played a considerable role by recommending
the adoption of standard policy forms for life insurance, following the
fire insurance example. 3 In 1906 the New York legislature provided
standard forms for ordinary life, limited payment life, endowment and
term insurance. Other forms could be approved by the Superintendent
under a procedure that included hearing competing companies.74 These
policies were fully compulsory, apart from the possibility of obtaining
variations through an administrative procedure. This method of regulation soon appeared to be a failure, perhaps as an obstacle to development;
it had a purely technical and remediable defect, too-foreign insurers
were not required to use the New York standard policy forms and could
offer more attractive policies, thus gaining a competitive advantage."
In 1909, New York abandone d the scheme of standard policy forms in
favor of a system of required provisions.7 ' No other states appear to
have prescribed compulsory standard forms for life insurance,7 though
M cH. INS. CODE § 2824 (1956).
73. "It is deemed advisable that standard forms of policies of these classes
72.

should be established." Report of the Joint Committee of the Senate and Assembly of the
State of New York Appointed to Investigate the Affairs of Life Insurance Companies,
Assembly Doc. No. 41, vol. 10, at 439 (1906).
74. N.Y. Laws 1906, ch. 326, § 37 (adding new § 101 to the Insurance Law). See
also Michaelson & Goodridge, Filing and Approval of Policy Forms, in EXAXiNATION
OF INSURANCE COMPANIES, 367, 368-69 (N.Y. State Ins. Dep't ed. 1955); AIRHEIN,
THE LmnP, LIzATIoN OF THE LIFE INSURANCE CONTRACT 49-59 (1933). Harris (of the

New York Department), State Legislation Affecting the Life Insurance Contract, in
THE LIFE INSUANCcE POLICY CONTRACT 337, 339 (Krueger & Waggoner ed. 1953) says
that the superintendent did promulgate four standard forms differing from the
statutory models.
75. Appleton, Wherein Have Insurance Conditions Improved Ditring the Past
Twenty Years in the Field of Life Insurance, 1915 NCIC PROCEEDINGS 97; AMRHEIN,
op. cit. supra note 74, at 58-59.
76. Laws of 1909, ch. 301, §§ 6 (repealing former § 101 of the Insurance Law),
7 (adding new § 101). See also Michaelson & Goodridge, supra note 74, at 369. A
student comment in 29 IND. L.J. 635 (1954) recently urged adoption of standard forms
in life insurance.
77. Harris, supra note 74, at 339 reports, without authority, that four other states
followed New York in 1907. No such statutes have been found. A bill introduced in
the Wisconsin legislature in 1883 would have required that uniform policies for life,
fire, accident and extended coverage insurance be approved by the Commissioner and
Attorney General. Ass'y Bill 192. Undoubtedly a thorough search in legislative
materials would reveal many such attempts, and perhaps some statutes, but the search
would be too time-consuming to be worth the effort.
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a few have introduced optional standard policy forms, alternative to a
system of required standard provisions and prohibited provisions."
iii. The standard automobile insurance policy. Standard
policies exist in the automobile insurance business. They are required by
administrative action in some states and in all states there has traditionally
been substantial uniformity as a result of cooperative effort within the
industry itself.
iv. The implementation of standard policies. The standard policy requirement can be implemented by public law means. Under
the Michigan statute, for example, a monetary penalty of $250 can be
imposed for each offense of issuing any policy or contract in violation
of the standard fire policy law; the commissioner is also authorized to
revoke the license of an insurer violating these provisions."' Also, the
standard policy can be, and generally is, given effect by private law
means. For instance, the Michigan statute provides that noncomplying
provisions are void and that the policy will be enforced exactly as if
it did comply with the statutory terms.8 " This private law, or selfexecuting, character of a statute prescribing an entire policy or standard
provisions, or prohibiting other provisions, permits a direct and natural
method of enforcement that makes the statutory prescription or prohibition of policy terms closely akin to the European method of enacting
compulsory rules of law into the insurance contract code.81
b. Standard provisions laws and their implementation. The
requirement that a policy contain specified individual provisions has become the most common device of insurance contract control in the United
States. Required provisions can be found in all kinds of policies of life
insurance (individual and group, annuities and disability, industrial),2
accident and sickness insurance (individual and group), liability insur78.

See

AMRHEIN, Opl.

cit. supra note 74, at 60 n.19; Smith, Statutory Regulation

of the Terms and Conditions of a Life Insurance Contract, in 1953 ABA SECTION
INSURANCE LAW PROCEEDINGS 110.

§§ 26-03-26 to 03-36 (1960).

One such statute still exists. N.

OF

DAK. CENT. CODE

MICHr. INS. CODE § 2866 (1956).
80. MICH. INS. CODE § 2860 (1956); N.Y. INS. LAW § 143.
81. See notes 152-72 infra and accompanying text.
82. The life insurance standard provisions laws usually include required provisions
allowing a grace period (usually of a month), making the policy incontestable after
one or two years, altering the effect of misrepresentations made by the insured,
adjusting the amount of the policy in case of misstatement of age, providing for

79.

participation in surplus, governing policy loans, defining and prescribing nonforfeiture

benefits and cash surrender values and providing for reinstatement after lapse. Often
required, too, is a provision that the policy and its attached application shall constitute
the entire contract between the parties. Other prescriptions appear somewhat less
frequently.

some detail.

Smith, sapra note 78, at 112-18, deals with these required provisions in
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ance and credit life and credit accident and health insurance.83
It was once surprisingly common for a statute to require that
standard provisions be inserted in policies in the exact wording and order
of the statute; in effect, such a statute supplied a partial standard policy.
Some statutes of this nature are still in force, but the trend in standard
provisions laws has been toward allowing greater flexibility in wording,
requiring the provisions to be inserted "in substance" only, or more frequently, permitting different language if it is not less favorable to the
insured." As the "in substance" approach presupposes the existence
of an authority to decide whether the requirement is met, statutes generally direct that the altered language must be approved by the commissioner."5
Another set of statutes requires insurance provisions that deal with
specified subjects in certain ways, without indicating the exact language
to be used. For example, Michigan requires the life insurance contract
to contain a provision
for a grace of 1 month for the payment of every premium after
the first year, which may be subject to an interest charge,
during which month the insurance shall continue in force,
which provision may contain a stipulation that if the insured
shall die during the month of grace the overdue premium will
be deducted in any settlement under the policy."
Such provisions, of which there are a great number, direct the company
to draft a clause that incorporates the sense of the statute-the language
of the statute may be more or less apt to the purpose and may need
adaptation. Statutory provisions like the foregoing are by nature semicompulsory.
83. See, e.g., N.Y. INs. LAW §§ 155, 158-64; MICH. INs. CODE §§ 3004-08, 3406-24,
3608, 3620, 3640, 4008-36, 4060, 4204-38, 4430-42 (1956) ; Mich. Pub. Acts 1958, No.
173; WIs. STATS. §§ 204.31(3) (a), 206.18, 206.181, 206.61 (1959).

84. See Michaelson & Goodridge, supra note 74, at 373. Compare the 1912 NCIC
Uniform Accident and Health Provisions bill with the 1950 version. They are found as
Appendices A and B in ACCIDENT AND SICKNESS INSURANCE 263-85 (McCahan ed.
1954). The latter provides for change in language with permission of the commissioner,
if no less favorable to the policyholder. New York already had the "in substance"
approach in 1910 (N.Y. Sess. Laws 1910, ch. 636, § 1, adding new § 107 to the Insurance
Law) but abandoned it when the NCIC bill was adopted (N.Y. Sess. Laws 1913, ch.
155, § 1-2. It has now followed the liberalization in the 1950 NAIC model bill. N.Y.
INS. LAW § 164.
85. E.g., N.Y. INS. LAW § 155: "No policy of life insurance . . . shall be delivered . . . unless it contains in substance the following provision or provisions
which in the opinion of the superintendent are more favorable to policyholders. .. ."
PA. STAT. ANN. § 40-753 (Purdon ed. 1954): "[elach such policy . . . shall contain
the provisions specified . . .: Provided, however, That the insurer may, at its option,
substitute . . . provisions of different wording approved by the commissioner which
are . . . not less favorable . . . to the insured ..
86. MIcI. INS. CODE § 4012 (1956).
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The most important standard provisions are those in life insurance
and accident and sickness insurance. In life insurance there is to be
found, among others, the carefully worked out standard nonforfeiture
law.8" In the latter field is to be found the Uniform Individual Accident
and Sickness Policy Provisions Law, adopted by NAIC in its June, 1950
meeting, and enacted into law by 45 states by 1957.88

This uniform

law contains twelve required provisions. It also contains optional provisions, of which more will be said below. The required provisions deal
with such things as a grace period for the payment of premiums, reinstatement, incontestability, claim notices and other equally important matters.
They provide a substantial amount of protection to the policyholder
against unfair treatment and seem to be very acceptable terms.
Closely related to standard provisions are "prohibited provisions,"
clauses deemed so injurious or unfair to the insured that the legislature
intervenes to prohibit them. In life insurance it is common to prohibit
provisions that exclude coverage in the event of death caused in a
specified manner, with certain exceptions that permit war and aviation
clauses.89 Some other prohibited provisions are those providing for
forfeiture for nonpayment of indebtedness, limiting the time within
which an action must be brought, back-dating the policy more than a
specified length of time, providing for settlement at less than face value,
or purporting to make the solicitor an agent of the policyholder."
In standard provisions laws there are also "optional" provisions
that require the insurer to deal with certain subjects in prescribed ways,
if it chooses to deal with them at all. Thus the Michigan statutes, adopting the Uniform Individual Accident and Sickness Policy Provisions
Law, permit a company writing disability insurance to deal with change
of occupation, misstatement of age, other insurance, relation of earnings
to insurance, unpaid premiums, cancellation, conformity with state
statutes, illegal occupations, intoxicants and narcotics, but only in the
terms prescribed in the statutes.9
Variations among the standard provisions laws of the states are
numerous; to the extent the state laws are inconsistent with each other
they present potential impediments to successful multi-state operations
of insurers. But the problems can largely be solved by enacting appropriate statutes giving some flexibility. New York provides, for
example, that a
E.g., N.Y. INS. LAw § 208-a.
88. See notes 26 & 84 supra.
89. See, e.g., N.Y. INs. LAw § 155(2) ; MicH. INS. CoDE §§ 4046, 4244(c) (1956).
90. Smith, supra note 78, at 118-19.
91. MICH. INS. CoDE §§ 3430-54 (1956). See also Wis. STAT. § 204.31(3) (b) (1961).
87.
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foreign or alien insurer . . . may, with the approval of the

superintendent, insert in its life, accident or health insurance
policies or annuity contracts delivered or issued for delivery in
this state any provisions required by the laws of the state or
country in which such insurer is domiciled if such provisions
are not substantially in conflict with any law of this state.2
What was said about the implementation of standard policy laws
applies also to standard provisions laws. In general, the American
statutes provide both public law and private law consequences for failure
to conform. Thus a $100 monetary penalty or fine can be assessed for
each offense against any person willfully violating any of the Michigan
policy provisions requirements for disability insurance.2 But the Michigan statute also provides private law effects for disability insurance:
"A policy delivered or issued for delivery to any person in this state in
violation of this insurance code shall be held valid but shall be construed
as provided in this code." 9 This dual enforcement of the requirement
is typical of the states. Much less common are self-executing rules of law
that do not also require insertion in the policy. They may easily be
found, of course."
III.

JUDICIAL CONTROL OF POLICY TERMS IN THE UNITED STATES

This paper would not be complete without brief discussion of

judicial control of policy terms. Judicial control lacks plan, for it
depends on the accidents of litigation. Nonetheless it is far-reaching.
Of necessity, it is also subtle, because of the basic assumption from which
judicial action begins: that apart from certain basic public policy
limitations which are grounded in fundamental moral conceptions, parties
to contracts are free to make contracts as they choose unless the legislature
imposes restrictions. The role of the court, so goes the theory, is to apply
the law and not to make it-hence, on the whole to effectuate the "will"
of the parties. Normal judicial action serves only to determine whether
contracts comply with legislative standards and to enforce them to the
extent that they do. The fact is not quite so simple as the theory; the
theory is not wholly demonstrable by the fact.
92. N.Y. INs. LAw § 144.
93. MICH. INs. CODE § 3480 (1956).
94. MiCH. INS. CODE § 3468 (1956).
95.

The valued policy laws are illustrations of such self-executing laws. See, e.g.,

Wis. Laws 1874, ch. 347 (now Wis. STAT. § 203.21 (1961) ; see also KIMrBA.L, op. cit.
supra note 62, at 240-49, and the Mississippi valued policy statute referred to in
Palatine Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Nunn, 99 Miss. 493, 55 So. 44 (1911). The Missouri statute
providing that suicide shall be no defense in life insurance is self-executing. See
Whitfield v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 205 U.S. 489 (1907). Warranty and representation
statutes often are in this form, though frequently another separate section of the statutes
requires insertion as well. See, e.g., Kimball, supra note 46, at 468-71.
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A.

The Public Policy Restrictions

As used by the courts in the insurance context, public policy has a
very limited meaning. It has imposed the doctrine of insurable interest
on insurance policies; they are contrary to public policy and void unless
the interest insured is regarded by the courts as insurable. Though this
doctrine bulks large in textual discussions of insurance law, it has relatively little practical significance, since the conservative and often overly
cautious insurance industry is not anxious to undertake obligations
where insurable interest is doubtful.
Equally limited in importance are the few other instances in which
insurance policies have been declared invalid or unenforcible for violation
of public policy. In England, for example, a life insurance policy may
not cover suicide while sane,96 though in the United States the authorities
are divided, with one line holding that there is no such public policy
limitation.9" Murder of the insured by the beneficiary under a life insurance policy raises similar questions.9" It should be noted that, unlike the
insurable interest limitation, these latter limitations do not invalidate
entire policies but merely exclude certain coverages.
A catalogue of public policy limitations does not seem necessary.
The above illustrations should suffice to show the judicial method of
controlling insurance contracts through public policy doctrines.
B.

Control Through Interpretation

The freedom of contract doctrine and the rule of construction contra
proferentem, which interprets ambiguities against the drafting party (a
rule stringently applied in contracts of adhesion and therefore in insurance contracts), provide the framework within which the courts exercise
significant control over the terms of insurance policies. A doctrine
reserving to the contracting parties the freedom to stipulate as they
will means that an insurer can, if it is willing to pay a large enough price
in patience and determination, refine its contracts to produce almost any
desired result. There does not exist in the common law any general
requirement that a contract satisfy certain "minimum decencies""9 in
order to be enforcible, nor can a court overtly reconstruct the contract
96. Beresford v. Royal Ins. Co., [1938] A.C. 586 (H.L.).
97. See GOBLE, CASES ON INSURANcE 297-303 (2d ed. 1949). See also Mo. Rxv.
STAT. § 376.620 (1959)
(suicide no defense under policy contract, even when stipulated
for, unless insurer proves contemplation of suicide at time of entering into contract).
The statute was said not to be subject to constitutional challenge. Whitfield v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co., 205 U.S. 489, 495 (1907) (dictum).
98. See PATTERSON & YOUNG, CASES ON INSURANcE 294-98 (4th ed. 1961).
99. The expression is borrowed from a provocative short essay on the subject of
this section. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARv. L. REv. 700, 703 (1939).
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to supply such minimum decencies. Instead a court purports only to
construe-to ascertain what the parties intended. But a doctrine of
construction contra proferentem makes it possible for an imaginative and
unsympathetic court to put the price in patience and determination required for achievement of the company's goals at a very high figure
indeed. Interference by the courts has permanent effect only if the policy
drafters acquiesce, but even if they do not, it can be very effective
while it lasts.' 0
One example of the extent of judicial control of policy terms is to
be found in the interpretation of the insuring clause of an accident
policy. The cases in which the courts have broadened the "accidental
means" clause to include situations where there were no accidental means
but was only an accidental result have provided legal counsel of insurance
companies with a liberal education in the plasticity of language.'
Cases
in which a notion of "constructive delivery" was used to defeat company
efforts to delay the effective date of a life insurance policy until actual,
physical delivery to the insured have given an object lesson in the capacity
of courts to extend liability to a number of circumstances the company
did not intend to cover." ' The classic case that shows how close a court
can come to legislating required policy terms (or prohibited policy terms)
in the guise of contract interpretation is the celebrated case of Gaunt v.
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co."'0 There Justice Learned Hand interpreted the language "shall be in effect . . . if this application . . . is,

prior to my death, approved by the Company at its Home Office . . ."
to provide coverage despite an absence of approval at the home office,
on the theory that, in context, a man in the street would have so understood the language. Justice Clark would have elevated the question to
one of public policy and denied the company the right, under the
circumstances, to exclude coverage with any language. In his concurring
opinion he showed great insight into the nature of the subtle control of
courts over contract terms. Condemning Justice Hand's approach, which
100. See Kimball, The Role of the Court in the Development of Insurance Law,
1957 Wis. L. RE,. 520, where the development in Wisconsin is described. KIMBALL,
INSURANCE AND PUBLIC PoLIcY 209-13, 237-39 (1960) also deals with the Wisconsin
development. 1 MAcGILLIVRAY, INSURANCE LAW 340-52 (5th ed. Browne 1961) provides a good statement of the received doctrinal apparatus for contract interpretation
as applied to insurance. It is believed the doctrine should not be taken too seriously,
however, at least in the American setting, and probably in England as well.
101. PATTERSON & YOUNG, op. cit. supra note 98, 319-26.
102. See GoBLE, op. cit. supra note 97, at 34-40. But Patterson, The Delivery of a
Life-Insurance Policy, 33 HAv. L. Ray. 198, 221 (1919) asserts that a majority of
courts give the language its literal meaning and do not distort it.
103. 160 F.2d 599 (2d. Cir. 1947). See also the thoughtful views of Kessler,
Contracts of Adhesion-Sone Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV.

629 (1943).
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rested on an asserted ambiguity, as certain to produce continuing uncertainty in such contracts, Justice Clark maintained that the court had an
obligation to exercise some control over the course of contract negotiation
by forbidding certain courses of conduct and certain stipulations as
"unpardonable."
The courts' practices "purport to construe, and do not really construe, nor are intended to, but are instead tools of intentional and creative
misconstruction.
"10, Yet this leads to confusion and unpredictability, for "covert tools are never reliable tools."' °5 Under the guise of
construction, they are used to distort, to remodel, to avoid, to misconstrue, to supply the "minimum decencies" that cannot be overtly
compelled by the court. The rule of construction contra proferen tem
thus has two disparate uses, as applied in insurance cases: (1) to settle
doubts against the person who could have avoided them by better drafting
and (2) to impose the court's (society's) moral views on the parties
by creating ambiguities where none exist and then resolving them
against the drafting party. There is, perhaps, a better justification for
the first use than that the drafter could have removed the ambiguity.
At the moment of claim, the insured is likely to be in need of the help
provided by valid insurance protection; his financial need rather than the
drafter's negligence justifies the resolution of doubts in his favor and
for that reason his reasonable expectations should be fulfilled.
Recital of a number of interpretation problems suggests the conclusion that company and court are always antagonists, with the company
seeking always and sometimes vainly to find language a court cannot
distort, even if it reads the policy in bad faith. In truth there have been
instances of long-lasting "struggles" over forms, but an unqualified
assumption of hostility would be an unwarranted oversimplification.
The cases that established the distinction between hostile and friendly
fires. 6 make clear that a court is not always anxious to impose excessive
liability upon a company. The interaction is more complex than that.
Within the framework of contract construction the courts have a
considerable, though sometimes only temporary, control over the content
of an insurance policy. Sometimes, and especially where a company has
no serious objection to the results reached, the effect may be long-lasting,
or even permanent. At least, the interaction of court and policy drafter
is a major cause of the complexity of insurance contracts, since many
104. Llewellyn, supra note 99, at 703.
105. Ibid.
106. GOBLE, op. cit. supra note 97, at 752-56.
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new clauses and much complicated phraseology can be traced to the
drafter's desire to overcome the impact of cases.
The construction of insurance contracts creates, in effect, rules of
law. Since they can usually be displaced, in theory at least, by contrary
stipulation of the parties, it is appropriate to characterize them as dispositive rules of law. Where basic public policy prevents displacement
even for the benefit of the insured, as with the insurable interest doctrine,
the rule of law is truly and fully compulsory-ius cogens. When a court,
though relying on techniques of interpretation, has in fact made it
impossible for the parties (more accurately, the insurer) to displace the
rule, it has again created a rule of law compulsory in practice though not
in theory. Such a rule might better be described as quasi-compulsory.
For the most part, such rules are at most semi-compulsory; alteration
to the benefit of the insured is rarely precluded by court action.
Often difficult questions of insurance economics and even of
actuarial science are involved in the control of insurance policy terms.
Lawyers and judges ordinarily have only the slightest of competence in
these questions. In Germany the courts occasionally ask the federal
insurance department for an advisory opinion, without any obligation
to adopt it, of course. American courts might make use of that possibility
through the institution of the amicus curiae, but there is no discernible
disposition to do so. Courts could also insist that they be better informed
by attorneys, few of whom take the trouble to understand the complexities
of the insurance business.
1. The displacement of the rule contra proferentem. In most statements of the rule of construction contra proferentem, it has been justified
by the fact that the insurance company drafted the contract. When that
basis for the rule disappears, as when the legislature stipulates the terms
of the contract, or when it is in fact prepared by the policyholder himself,
by a broker for the benefit of the policyholder who is his client, by a
trade association of which the policyholder is a member, or when the
policy is prepared and used by a participating mutual, in which the policyholder is both insurer and insured, or when the policy is subject to
administrative control, there is said to be reason to reconsider and
perhaps to abrogate the rule. Thus industry spokesmen often express
the view that the standard policy, the standard provisions of policies
that are left partly free, and contracts of the other listed classes should
not be construed against the insurance company but in accordance with
the fair meaning of the language they contain.'
This viewpoint fails
107. Compare Smith, supra note 78, at 125, and VANCE,
1951), with 3 RicHARDs, INSURANCE 1315 (5th ed. 1952).

INSURANCE 809

(3d ed.
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to acknowledge the significant role of industry representatives in drafting
standard policies. Standard policies and provisions are not necessarily
imposed on unwilling companies by a vindictive legislature; the industry
organizations have their chance to influence the terms. Moreover, the
early standard policies were entirely industry-drafted and the usual rule
should apply there, at least.
Nor does the suggestion that these should be a new rule of interpretation consider the dual character of the rule. Partly it is intended to and
does settle doubtful cases; partly it imposes minimum decencies on the
drafting party. The second aspect of the rule disappears in the listed
cases, but the first does not. True, not manufactured, ambiguities will
always exist, and though there is no justification for deciding them
against the insurance company as punishment for its negligence, there
is a strong argument that they should be decided in favor of coverage in
order that the insurance institution may more adequately perform its
social function. This argument does not depend on the relative strength
of the parties but on the stabilizing function of insurance. It would
convert the rule from one contra proferentem to one in favor of protection, which would operate only where a true ambiguity existed. The
cases provide very little enlightenment on this question."0 8
IV. STATUTORY CONTROL OF POLICY TERMS IN EUROPE

A.

HistoricalBackground

The historical development of the law dealing with the terms of the
insurance contract was not the same everywhere in Europe. A code came
relatively early in Switzerland and Germany, for example, and rather
late in France. The various patterns of control reflect to some extent the
points of time at which they developed. One can generalize only with
caution about contemporary European control, which differs from state
to state, but perhaps one can conclude that in general the European
systems other than the English differ basically from that of the United
States as a consequence of the modern civil law method, in which legal
rules are normally passed in code form by the legislature rather than
developed through court decisions. Even this generalization ignores many
important variations in Europe.
1. England. Significant legislation on insurance contracts has de108. Shephard, Current Developments in the Constiruction of Contracts of Insurance, Which Contain Actucal or Alleged Ambiguities, 1959 VERSICHERUNGSWISSENSCIAFTLICHES ARcHIV 465, provides relevant cases and comments upon them. See also VANCE,
INSURANCE 808-10 (3d ed. 1951).
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veloped in England only for industrial life insurance" 9 and marine insurance. The latter is a branch that is elsewhere generally free from
much intervention. But the English exception for marine is more apparent
than real. A uniform policy was developed in the 18th century among
the marine underwriters at Lloyds, and in 1906 that policy was included
in a Schedule to the Marine Insurance Act with numerous attached
interpretative notes. While it was not made compulsory, the legislative
blessing encourages its use, and it is very commonly employed in the
marine insurance business. The act also contains a variety of statutory
"rules of law" affecting the contract."'
2. Switzerland. Switzerland established a regulatory agency very
early, in 1885. In most cantons, there already existed some laws regulating insurance, though the main objective was not to control but to collect
as much revenue as possible from insurance companies."' The statute
creating the regulatory agency was only partly developed, as befitted the
date of its appearance, and it was gradually supplemented by other
statutes and governmental orders elaborating the system of administrative
surveillance. Nevertheless it provided for wide powers of control over
all insurance enterprises, except locally restricted concerns and public
law institutions based on cantonal law."' When discussion began in the
1890's about the desirability of codifying the law of the insurance contract, the Eidgeniissiches Versichwrungsamt or Swiss Insurance Department was able to assign Dr. Hans Roelli, a legally trained staff member,
to prepare a draft of an insurance contract law. After over two years'
work, he published his proposal in 1896. It was debated thoroughly and
then formed the basis of a 1908 law". which has been little changed since.
3.

Germany. The idea that the insurance business should be regu-

109. The Industrial Assurance Act, 1923, 13 & 14 Geo. V, c. 8. It bad elaborate
provisions including nonforfeiture benefits and other minimum benefits. They create
self-executing rules of law, the more important of which must be contained in the
policy. Similarity of English method to American makes it unnecessary for present
purposes to deal in further detail with it.
110. The Marine Insurance Act, 1906, 6 Edw. 7, c. 41.

111.

HAYMANN,

LA SURVEILLANCE

DES SOClET] S D'ASSURANCES

EN SUISSE ET LA

(1932).
112. Law of June 25, 1885, [1885] Bundesgesetz betreffend Beaufsichtigung von
Privatunternebmungen im Gebiete des Versicherungswesens § 1, as amended (hereinafter
referred to as the Swiss VAG), in 2 NEUES RECHTSBUCH DER SCrrwEIZ 329 (Bundeskanzlei ed. 1946).
113. Law of April 2, 1908, [1908] Bundesgesetz fiber den Versicherungsvertrag
(hereinafter referred to as Swiss VVG), in 1 NEUES RECHTSBUCH DER SCHWEIZ 536
(Bundeskanzlei ed. 1946). For details of the development and the close interrelation
between the German and Swiss codes, see 4 ROELLI-JAEGER, KOMMENTAR ZUM
SCHWEIZERIscHEN BUNDESGESETZ TiBER DEN VERSICHERUNGSVERTRAG VOm 2. APRIL 1908
JURISDICTION AD.MINISTRATIVE DU TRIBUNAL FD9RAL 21-22

70-76 (1933).
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lated nationally rather than by single states was advanced early in Germany; in 1851 the participants of a convention of economists called for
nationwide legislation."" Insurance was enumerated among the matters
subject to federal control in the constitution of the Norddeutscher Bund
of 1867.115 Meantime, however, the individual states had already developed some regulatory statutes. By the end of the nineteenth century
most German states had some supervision, and the major ones, such as
Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony and Wurttemberg, exercised considerable control, comparable to the modern form of substantive regulation." 6 The
statutes of the various states varied widely, with great divergence in the
extent of power given to the regulatory agencies and in the treatment
of the different kinds of insurance. Lack of qualified personnel made
much of the supervision perfunctory.
As the insurance companies began to operate nationally, a request
for a national law was repeated with increasing urgency. Though the
constitution of the NorddeutscherBund of 1867 gave the federal government power to regulate insurance, it was only after much travail that
in 1901 a law was passed establishing a federal regulatory agency and
giving it extensive power to control all aspects of the insurance business,
including the terms of contracts." 7 Only small local mutuals and public
law institutions remain subject to state control. The law was well conceived and developed, and no major changes have been made since with
respect to control of policy terms.
The need for legislation dealing with the substantive law of the
114. MANES, DAS REICHSGESETZ -OBER DIE PRIVATEN VERSICIERUNGSUNTEnEHmuNGEN vom 12. MAI 1901 2-3 (1901).
115. Verfassung des Norddeutschen Bundes, July 26, 1867, [1867] Bundesgesetzblatt
des Norddeutschen Bundes 2, art. 4, no. 1. This was continued in the constitution of
1871 and the Weimar Constitution of 1919. Verfassung des Deutschen Reichs, April
16, 1871, [1871] Reichsgesetzblatt 63, art. 4, no. 1; Verfassung des Deutschen Reichs,
Aug. 11, 1919, [1919] Reichsgesetzblatt 1383, art. 7, no. 17. The 1949 Constitution
provides for "concurring" legislative power; the states may legislate until the federal
die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, May 23, 1949 [1949]
legislature acts. Grundgesetz ffir
Bundesgesetzblatt 1, art. 74, no. 11. But the federal Versicherungsaufsichtsgeset!, section
153, leaves little room for state law, other than state public law institutions such as for
compulsory fire insurance. Very small enterprises are also subject to state control,
though under the federal statutes. Gesetz fiber die Errichtung eines Bundesaufsichtsamtes ffir das Versicherungs- und Bausparwesen, July 31, 1951 (known as Bundesaufsichtsgesetz), §§ 2-4 [1951] Bundesgesetzblatt 480.
116. Bfichner, Die Entwicklung der deutschen Gesetzgebung iiber die Versicherungsaufsicht bis sum Bundesgesetz vore 31. Ali i951, in FNINFZIG JAHRE MATERIELLE
VERSICHERONGSAUFSICHT NACHI DEM GESETZ Vom 12. MAI 1901, at 7 (Rohrbeck ed. 1952).
117. Reichsgesetz fiber die privaten Versicherungsunternehmungen, May 12, 1901,
[1901] Reicbsgesetzblatt

139.

After some changes it was repromulgated as Gesetz

fiber die Beaufsichtigung der privaten Versicherungsunternehmungen und Bausparkassen,
June 6, 1931, [19311 Reichsgesetzblatt I, at 315, 750 (or Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetz).
The situation before 1901 and the reasons for the law are illuminated in Bfichner, op.

cit. supra note 116, at 7-19.
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insurance contract was also felt in Germany in the latter part of the
nineteenth century, after insurance had become a large and important
business. As with the Swiss development, the basic question was how the
law of the insurance contract should be related to the commercial codes
that were developing during that period. The ocean marine insurance
contract was dealt with by the general German Commercial Code of
1861 ;118 not until 1908 were the rules pertaining to the other insurance
contracts codified in the Insurance Contract Law, which was applicable
to all kinds of insurance except ocean marine and reinsurance." 9 Only
minor changes have been made in the statute since 1908. Both the Swiss
and German insurance contract laws are essentially self-executing; they
create rules of private law directly applicable in the enforcement of the
insurance contract by the courts.
4. Austria. Austria was the first European country to establish
a comprehensive central administrative supervision over insurance.12
The organic act, the Versicherungsregulativ of 1880, stated in a short
preamble the principles governing all regulatory activity: "To ensure the
constant capacity of the insurance enterprises to perform the obligations
assumed and to safeguard the interests of the insured... .""' While
the greater part of the regulation was concerned with requirements for
company organization, it also required that general contract terms have
government approval and that certain specific points be treated in them. 2
The similarity of these points to the corresponding section of the later
German Versicherungaufsichtsgesetzestablishes the fact that the Austrian
legislation was to some extent the model for the German.
An amending Verordnung issued in 1896 required life insurers to
insert in their Allgemeihe Versiclerungsbedihgungen-thegeneral terms
of the insurance contract-specified nonforfeiture benefits and cash
surrender calues. This seems to be the only provision in the GermanAustrian-Swiss family of laws using a technique similar to the American
one of requiring certain provisions. It appeared to trench upon the field
118. BRUCx, DAS PRIVATVERSICHFRUNGSRECHT 7-14 (1930).
119. Reichsgesetz fiber den Versicherungsvertrag, May 30, 1908, [1908] Reichs-

gesetzblatt 263 (or Versicherungsvertragsgesetz).
120. Verordung der Ministerien des Innern, der Justiz, des Handels und der
Finanzen, Aug. 18, 1880 (hereafter referred to as Versicherungsregulativ), [1880]
Austrian Reichsgesetzblatt 398, amended by Verordung, March 5, 1896, [1896] Austrian

Reichsgesetzblatt 63, and revised by Verordnung, March 7, 1921, [1921] Austrian Bundesgesetzblatt 403.
121. "Zur Sicherung der steten Erffillbarkeit der von den Versicherungsanstalten
fibernommenen Verpflichtungen und zur Wahrung der Interessen der Versicherten

werden ffir die Errichtung und staatliche Beaufsichtigung von Versicherungsanstalten
die nachstehenden Bestimmungen aufgestellt ..
122. Versicherungsregulativ § 10.
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of private law, and this attempt to affect private law relationships by an
administrative Verordnung met with severe criticism.123
The late development of an Austrian insurance contract law stands
in marked contrast to the early development of a system of regulation.
When it came in 1917,"' it relied heavily on the German law of 1908.1"5
After Anschluss with Germany in 1938, amendments were made in the
German law to adopt some of the Austrian innovations and create a
uniform code for all of the German Reich. 2 ' In 1958 an independent
Austria reenacted the insurance contract code with little more than formal
changes. 2 ' The German and Austrian codes are now essentially identical.
Likewise, in 1939 the German regulatory law was made effective in
Austria, and today the two laws are substantially the same.' 28
5. France. Except for marine insurance, which was dealt with in
the Code de Commerce of 1807, the French law of the insurance contract
remained free from legislative restrictions (other than those applying
to all kinds of contracts) until 1930, except for some miscellaneous acts
dealing with such problems as payment to creditors of the policyholder,
court jurisdiction in insurance matters, the legality of insurance on the
life of children under 12 years, and the termination and renewal of
insurance contracts.2 9 Perhaps the necessity for state control was somewhat lessened by policyholder self-protection. A Ligue des Assures was
formed by policyholders and bargained with insurers to produce, in 1912,
a fire insurance policy with reasonable terms.'
Life insurance was
thought unlawful by some authors since Section 334 of the Code de
Commerce provided that only things with an ascertainable value could
be insured.' After repeated discussions continuing from 1902, a comprehensive Insurance Code was enacted in 1930,132 applicable to all kinds
123. 1896 Juristische Blitter 123-24. See p. 730 infra.
124. Gesetz fiber den Versicherungsvertrag, Dec. 23, 1917 (known as Austrian
Versicherungsvertragsgesetz), [1917] Austrian Reichsgesetzblatt 50. For the development, see EHRENZWEIG, DEUTSCHES (OSTERREICHISCHES) VERSICHERUNGSVERTRAGSRECHT

11-12 (1952).
125. 4 ROELLI-JAEGER, op. cit. suprc note 113, at 76.
126. Verordnung zur Vereinheitlichung des Rechtes der Vertragsversicherung,
Dec. 19, 1939, [1939] Reichsgesetzblatt 1, at 2443.
127. Bundesgesetz, Dec. 2, 1958, fiber den Versicherungsvertrag (Versicherungsvertragsgesetz 1958), [1959] Austrian Bundesgesetzblatt 297.
128. See EHIRENZWEIG, op. cit. supra note 124, at 10.
129. See PICARD ET BESsoN, LES ASSURANCES TERRESTRES EN DROIT FRANCAIS
58-59 (1950); OECD, SUPERVISION OF PRIVATE INSURANCE IN FRANCE 10 (1963)
(hereinafter referred to as OECD STATEMENT (France)). This statement was prepared

for the OECD by the Direction des Assurances.
130. PRAUSNITZ, THE STANDARDIZATION OF
AND CONTINENTAL LAW

COMERCIAL CONTRACTS IN ENGLISH

23 (1937).

131. Hubrecht, Die Geschichte der Versicherunji in Frankreich, in 1958 VERSCIERUNGSWISSENSCHAFTLICHEs ARcfrIV 349, 362.
132. For more detail see 4 ROELLI-JAEGER, op. cit. supra note 113, at 76-78.
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of insurance contracts except marine, inland navigation, air transport,
fidelity and reinsurance. 3 Marine insurance is still governed by the
Code de Commerce; the other excepted branches of insurance law are
subject to no special statutory rules.
Public law legislation developed slowly, step by step, in single fields
of insurance. As early as 1787 the government in authorizing the formation of a life insurance company, demanded that a guarantee sum of
money be paid and that the general policy terms and premium rates be
submitted for royal approval.' 34 An 1868 act contained detailed provisions concerning the formation and the functioning of insurance enterprises but did not establish a special agency for effecting this control.
This act became the basis for the new legislation of 1938. The first line
of insurance to be subjected to organized and permanent control by a
specially designated administrative body was workmen's compensation
insurance in 1898; control was exercised by Commissaires Contr~leurs
acting under the authority of the Minister of Commerce." 5 Life insurance followed in 1905. After the association of automobile insurers
made urgent demand for protection against unfair competition by rebating, the Minister of Labor was authorized to supervise automobile
liability insurance in 1935."'
Different statutes for different lines of insurance led to inconsistency and prevented the control agencies from acting effectively. This
and the desire to help the insurance industry recover from the disastrous
effects of the depression resulted in the act of June 14, 1938, which
established a general license requirement for most insurance companies
and conferred upon the Minister of Labor broad powers concerning the
general conduct of insurers; government reorganization has led subsequently to the transfer of insurance supervision to the Ministry of
Finance.'
Some of the far-reaching powers, however, such as those
to make the general policy terms agreed upon by a majority compulsory
for all companies, were subsequently repealed before they had ever been
applied in practice.'
133. Loi du 13 juillet 1930.
134. OECD STATEMENT (France) 7; 1 HtmARD, TH-oaiE ET PRATIQUE DES
AssuRANcas TERRESTRES 180 (1924).
135. Loi du 9 avril 1898, art. 27 (France) ; see OECD STATEMENT (France) 7-8.
136. Loi du 17 mars 1905 and Dcret-Loi du 8 aofit 1935; see also OECD STATE-

9.
137. D~cret-Loi du 14 juin 1938; OECD STATEMENT (France) 10. Loi du 23
fcvrier 1941. For the motives, see the report accompanying the statute as reproduced
MENT (France)

in 1938

REVUE GgNtRALE DES ASSURANCES TERRESTRES 578-79; for the historical development, see Picard, L'Unification du Contr6le de l'Etat et de 'Organisationde l'Inudustrie
des Assurances, in 1938 REvUE GtN-RALE DES ASSURANcES TERRESTRES 646-47.
138. Dgcret-Loi du 14 juin 1938, arts. 32-33; repealed by loi du 16 aofit 1941.
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Important political and constitutional changes in France since 1939
have led to conflict among the different statutes which are still in force.
Moreover, some provisions are not actually applied. For example, the
department does not enforce compliance with the provision requiring
the filing of policy forms in certain lines of insurance, including marine
and suretyship, nor in group insurance. Similarly the department has not
yet exercised its broad power to impose upon the industry the use of
standard policy forms or rates.18 9
B.

The Preparationand Enactment of Statutes

It is tempting to make facile generalizations about the manner of
preparation and enactment of statutes in Europe; in fact, however, the
variety in manner is as great in Europe as it is in America. But it does
seem to be true that there are fewer differences among the continental
European countries than between them and the United States, so that
for some purposes it is appropriate to speak of a "European" method
of statutory enactment.
The legislative pattern of the continental insurance regulatory
systems is partly a function of general ideas about legislation and codification, which contrast sharply with those of the common-law countries.
In the civil law theory, statutes are considered the main source of the
law, not a supplementary one; the law embodied in the codes is assumed
to be a coherent and complete system. Consequently, statutes are usually
drafted with care to make them cohere with the system and provide a
reliable basis for the solution of problems.
A difference in political structure and method also plays an important role in distinguishing the legislative pattern of continental
European countries from that in the United States. Drafts of new
statutes or of amendments usually are prepared in a government department by government officials. Bills seldom originate in a legislature,
though a legislature may ask a department to prepare and submit a bill. 4
Likewise, a draft prepared by persons outside the government may induce
a government department to prepare a bill of its own. Thus, while the
BEssoN, op. cit. supra note 129, at 818. Marine and reinsurance, carried on
separately, were exempt from supervision under the 1938 act, but marine has subsequently
been included. D~eret-Loi du 14 juin 1938 art. 1 50, as amended by loi du 18 aofit 1942.
139. For the former, see D~cret du 30 d~cembre 1938, art. 181; for the latter,
Ordonnance du 29 Septembre 1945, art. 8. Statements about French developments not
supported by specific citations are based on interviews in the French department in
April 1962 and July 1964, and on internal instructions in use there.
140. Thus the legislative committee which considered the bill for the German
Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetz of 1901 not only recommended the adoption of the amended
bill but also asked the Reichskanzler to submit as soon as possible a bill on the law of the
insurance contract. Bfichner, op. cit. supra note 116, at 15.
Pic.AR
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initiative for drafting legislation may originate with the legislature or
private interest groups, the basic responsibility for the preparation of
statutes lies in the governmental department. The more important bills
are published before they are submitted to the legislature to give an
opportunity for public discussion. Usually there are also formalized
discussions, sometimes protracted, between representatives of the department and interested groups. With the resulting modifications, the bill is
finally introduced in the legislature, accompanied by an official comment, often of considerable length and detail. A standing committee of
the legislature then discusses the bill and submits a report, and the
legislature in plenary session makes the final decision. Committees generally do not conduct hearings but may receive and consider petitions
submitted to the legislature by interested persons.
1. Germany. The creation of the German Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetz is an example of the continental statutory process. The first
practical step toward the legislation was taken in 1869 by resolution of
the Bundesrat, the representative body of the Norddeutscher Bund, when
it asked the Bundeskauzier, or federal chancellor, to submit a draft for
such a law. The B undeskanzler thereupon started an inquiry into the
existing legislation of the states; drafts were submitted by officials of
two of the states. After unavoidable delay, in 1879 and 1881 the
Rcic7z.kamzler sent new circulars to the member states requesting statistical data on the insurance business. On the basis of these preliminary
studies a draft was written in 1883 by an Interior Department official,
who consulted with various insurance experts. The fundamental principles
and arrangements of this draft formed the core of the final law. Discussions with other departments of the imperial government and with
the state governments ensued, but the matter remained in abeyance until
an amended draft was published in 1896. Public discussion led to some
important changes, and the resulting draft went to the legislature in 1900.
A legislative committee held 26 meetings in which it disposed of about
500 motions; it also considered 14 petitions submitted by associations
of insurers and single insurers and by associations of policyholders and
businessmen having an interest in insurance.' 4'
141. See Bfichner, .rupra note 116, at 10-15; MANES, op. cit. supra note 114, at 1-22.
It is customary for the legislature or drafting departments to consult any group with
any interest in the matter. Since its creation, the insurance department has been an
active participant in the preparation of insurance statutes, though it is subordinate to
the Minister of Economics, and actual drafting usually takes place in the Ministry of
Justice. See, e.g., 1924 VER6&FENTLICHUNGEN DES REiCHSAUFSICHTSAMTS FOR PraIVAvEnsicHmauNG 16-19 where the insurance department proposed amendments to both the

Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetz and the Versicherungsvertragsgesetz in order to remedy
some of the adverse effects of the inflation. In 1903 the department submitted an

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
2. France. The French legislative method is basically similar to
the German. As a rule, bills are drafted carefully by government departments, and are thereafter subject to public discussion before going to
the legislature. For example, the law of February 27, 1958, establishing
compulsory motor vehicle liability insurance, was discussed thoroughly
in roundtable meetings by government officials and representatives of
automobile and tire manufacturers and automobile clubs before being
submitted to the legislature. As a subdivision of the Ministry of Finance,
the French Insurance Department takes an active part in the drafting
and subsequent discussion of legislative bills.
3. England. In England the government department plays a more
important role in the preparation of legislation than is the case at the
state level in the United States. But, of course, an English statute is
seldom expected to be a comprehensive codification; in this respect an
English statute is more like an American than a continental one.
C.

Legislative Control of Contract Terms

1. Formal and procedural requirements. Unlike the American
statutes, the German statutes contain no purely formal or procedural
provisions. Rather, these rules form a part of the administrative system
and will be discussed in that connection. The Swiss law likewise has few
formal provisions. The Swiss provision making a policy incontestable
must be inserted in the insurance policy, but this is a rare example of a
statute that itself provides for full information to the policyholder. The
sanction against noncompliance is nowhere indicated, though an authority
has contended that such contracts are not void but that the policyholder
142
retains his right to contest the policy.

On the other hand, the French law is in this respect like the American
and contains a number of provisions fixing formal requirements for the
policy. For example, the term of the policy must be indicated in prominent type; all policies of nonlife insurance must mention the right of both
parties to terminate the contract after a period of ten years, and there
must also be a reference to the statutory provision that automatic continuation of a contract cannot be for a longer period than one year at a
elaborate opinion on the draft for the proposed Insurance Contract Law (Versicherungsvertragsgesetz), prepared by the Department of Justice, and took part in further
discussions on the bill. 1904 VER6FFENTLICHUNGEN 101. [Both the "Ver6ffentlichungen
des Reichsaufsichtsamtes" (formerly Kaiserliches Aufsichtsamt) and the "Verbffentlichungen des Bundesaufsichtsamtes fiir das Versicherungs- and Bausparwesenn" (since
1952) will hereinafter be cited as "Ver6ffentlichungen."]
142. Swiss VVG § 12. 1 ROELLI-JAEGER, op. cit. supra note 113, at 184.
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time. 3 Surprisingly, in Great Britain the terms of the marine insurance
contract have received considerable attention from the legislature, and
the statute contains a number of provisions relating to the form of the
marine insurance policy. For instance, it provides that a contract of
marine insurance may not be admitted in evidence unless embodied in
a policy conforming to the statute, and that the policy must specify the
name of the insured, the subject-matter insured and the risk insured
against, the voyage or period of time, which must be not more than
twelve months, the sum insured and the names of the insurers.'4 4
2.

Substantive requirements.

a. Standard policies or standard provisions. The statutory
standard policy is completely foreign to the methods of the GermanAustrian-Swiss family of laws. Even required provisions are unusual
there. Such a standard policy would not necessarily be inconsistent with
the French method, but no statutory standard policies exist in France
or elsewhere in Europe, so far as can be ascertained.
However, the emergence of compulsory liability insurance in recent
decades has produced statutes setting forth certain minimum benefits
that will be permitted under the statute. This legislation has not usually
become part of the insurance contract codes but is to be found in separate
acts, such as the motor vehicle codes. The statutes normally do not
prescribe the entire policy but instead often stipulate minimum terms or
delegate the power to fix the terms to an administrative agency, not
necessarily the insurance department. 4 '
Such control of the terms of the insurance contract is of a different
nature from that previously discussed. It is imposed to guarantee
protection to certain groups of persons, such as traffic victims, victims
of hunting or other accidents, or sufferers from professional misconduct,
who will benefit indirectly from the coverage, rather than to protect the
policyholder, the insurer or others for the reasons commonly underlying
insurance regulation. In consequence, the statute often does no more
143. There are further formal requirements. Insurance contracts must be in
writing and must contain the names and addresses of the parties, the property or
person insured, the nature of the risk insured against, the effective date and the
term of the policy, the insured sum, and the premium. Life insurance policies must
contain additional information about the name and birthdate of the person whose
life is insured, the name of the beneficiary, if any, the event upon which the insured
sum will become due, and details of nonforfeiture and cash surrender values. Exclusion
clauses must be in prominent type; if they are not, they are void. Loi du 13 juillet 1930,
arts. 5, 9, 60.
144. Marine Ins. Act, 6 Edw. 7, c. 41, §§ 22-23.

145. Similar statutes exist in the United States but need not be discussed in this
paper.
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than specify minimum sums of coverage. Sometimes, however, more
detailed provisions may be prescribed, and occasionally a uniform policy
exists. The result is much like that produced by standard provisions
or standard policy laws in the United States.
It should be noted that the European compulsory insurance statutes
are basically police measures directed against the citizen (automobile
owner, hunter, etc.). They are enforced by public law means, by subjecting noncomplying citizens to fine or other punishment. They have
no direct private law effect on the relationships of the parties; insurance
contracts made in violation of the statutory minimum requirements
would nevertheless be binding and enforcible in the courts in accordance
with their terms.
In Germany, the statute introducing automobile owners' compulsory
liability insurance... contained two delegations of different kinds. First,
the minimum benefits of the policy were to be fixed by administrative
regulation of the Minister of Economics. Second, the statute directed
that the insurance contract be issued in accordance with uniform contract
terms (AVB) approved by the insurance department. To achieve complete uniformity and equality, a supplementary ministerial regulation
authorized the insurance department to make new AVB applicable to
existing contracts. The department exercised this authority with respect
to automobile liability insurance. 4 ' However, in other kinds of compulsory insurance, no uniformity is required, 4 ' and the AVB ordinarily
used in each branch of insurance are applicable.
In France, there are minimum provisions for various kinds of compulsory insurance. For instance, a law of February 27, 1958, requires
automobile owners to buy liability insurance, the minimum benefits of
which are to be fixed by government regulation made with the advice of
the Conseil National des Assurances.49 A regulation of January 7, 1959,
which should be regarded as legislative in character, enumerated a set
of minimum policy provisions, while allowing the insurers to develop
146. Gesetz fiber die Einfiihrung der Pflichtversicherung ffir Kraftfahrzeughalter
und zur Anderung des Gesetzes fiber den Verkehr mit Kraftfahrzeugen sowie des

Gesetzes fiber den Versicherungsvertrag, Nov. 7, 1939, [1939] Reichsgesetzblatt 1:2223,

§§3, 4.

147.

Verordnung fiber

die Anwendung Allgemeiner

Versicherungsbedingungen,

Nov. 29, 1940, [1940] Reichsgesetzblatt 1:1543.
148.

For a list of compulsory insurances, see 1

VERSICHERUTNGSVERTRAGSGESETZ

UND

DEN

BRUCx-MOLLER, KomMENTAR ZUM

ALLGEMEINEN

VERSICHERUNGSBEDINGUNGEN

115-17 (S. Aufl. 1961).
149. §§ 1, 10. The Conseil is an advisory body composed of representatives of
various areas of public life, established by loi du 25 avril 1946. It is patterned after a
similar and much older German institution, the Beirat. See PRaLSS, VERSICHERUNGSAUFSICHTSGESETZ 58-63 & passim (4 Aufl. 1963). OECD STATE MENT (France) 40-41
lists the more important compulsory insurances.
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policy forms containing benefits at least as generous as those required
by the regulation. In practice, all companies use a model form promulgated by the Insurance Department. The minimum stipulations were
made self-executing from the effective date of the law, i.e., they were
given private law effect similar to that in the United States. It is in
notable contrast to American notions that the stipulations had effect even
upon existing automobile liability policies, any contrary policy provisions
notwithstanding."'
In England the Marine Insurance Act of 1906 provides an optional
form of standard policy which is widely used, despite its quaint and
esoteric language. Its acceptance is an outgrowth of the statutory blessing
given to it, as well as to the "Rules for Construction of the Policy," the
development of that ancient document by Lloyd's, and the certainty and
reliability which accompany a document well tested and definitively interpreted by the courts'.'
b. Control through insurance contract codes. The normal method
by which the legislature itself controls the terms of insurance policies
is, however, through the enactment of insurance contract codes. Almost
totally foreign to the Anglo-American system of law, this method is
utilized extensively in Europe. German legislation on the insurance contract primarily serves the purpose of fixing rules of law which develop in
cases in the United States. In the European systems the expressions
"private law" and "public law" have fairly precise, technical meanings;
they mark two areas of law which are governed by different principles
and administered by different courts. In insurance, rules affecting the
contractual relation of insurer and policyholder are governed by private
law, and rules pertaining to government supervision of insurance enterprises are within the scope of public law. Though there is some overlap, "2
separate codes basically cover the two sets of rules: the Versicherungsvertraggsgesetz (VVG) of 1908 for the former, and the Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetz (VAG) of 1901 with ancillary statutes like the Bundesaufsiclhtsgesetz (BAG) of 1951 for the latter. The Swiss legislative pattern
closely resembles the German on this matter, while the Austrian is
identical.
150. Loi No 58.20S du 27 f~vrier 1958, Dcret N' 59-135 du 7 janvier 1959. A
similar method was used in introducing compulsory hunter's liability insurance. Here
the Ministers of Finance, of the Interior, and of Agriculture were authorized to
prescribe the minimum benefits by joint regulation. The insurers use the terms fixed
in this regulation rather than developing individual policy forms of their own. Loi N'
55-1524 du 28 novembre 1955. Arrt6 du 28 mai 1956.
151. See note 144 supra. See also DovFR, A HANDBOOK TO MARINE INSURANCE
233-34 (6th ed. 1962).
152. Swiss VAG §§ 14, 77(3) have immediate private law effect.
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One consequence of the clear distinction between public and private
law is a limitation of the scope of judicial review of contract terms in a
suit between insurer and policyholder. The judge considers only selfexecuting provisions (private law rules) that directly affect the contractual relations between the parties, coming mainly from the TVG.
Compliance of the company with public law provisions of the statutes
or with administrative orders, requiring the insertion of certain stipulations in the policy or the printing of some parts of the contract forms
with greater prominence than others, is sanctioned only by administrative
means and does not automatically become part of the contract. A provision may have both public and private law effects, but this is uncommon in the German system.
Whether a requirement is to be enforced by administrative means
(public law) or is to be self-executing (private law) is a choice to be
made by the legislature. So also is the determination of whether rules of
the former kind should be made by the legislature or the administrator.
For instance, the German code contains no provisions concerning the
mere form of the insurance contract, relegating such provisions entirely
to administrative determination and enforcement. On the other hand, the
Swiss code of 1908 requires that the policyholder be furnished a copy
of the general contract terms before he signs the application, and if the
insurer fails to provide this copy, the policyholder is not bound by the
application.'
That gives private law effect to the requirement, i.e., the
policyholder is not bound by the application unless he has received a copy
of the terms, or is estopped to assert invalidity of the contract by accepting the certificate of insurance and paying the premium without objection.1 The French code of 1930 requires prominent type for certain
clauses and voids the clauses unless this requirement is met;1" this
approach is similar to the American statutes that contain formal requirements which are self-executing, with noncomplying policy provisions
being void.
The decisions of whether the legislature should itself make the rule,
and then whether it should make the provision self-executing, depend
on the importance of the matter and how it can best be implemented.
Some problems require more flexibility than others and thus are more
suited to administrative than to legislative handling. Even if flexibility
is desirable, the legislature will delegate its rulemaking power only if it
can expect the agency to implement adequately the general purposes of
153.

Swiss Versicherungsvertragsgesetz art. 3.

154. See KoENIG, SCHWEIZERISCHES
1960).
155. Loi du 13 juillet 1930, arts. 8, 9.

PRIVATVERSICHERUNGSRECHT

61 (2. Aufl.

LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL CONTROL
the law. Where a permanent rule can be promulgated easily or the legislature cannot rely on effective administrative rulemaking, it may itself
prescribe a rule with direct effect on contracts.
To grasp German handling of the insurance contract, it must be
understood that the German word Police is not the same as the American
word "policy." The German Police or Versicherungschein refers to a
simple document containing only such data as the name and address
of the insured, the description of the insured property, the amount of
insurance and the premium to be paid. It is translated here as "certificate
of insurance," since its main purpose is to give evidence of the existence
of an insurance contract. It corresponds most nearly to the first page
of the typical American policy. The Police is then supplemented by
detailed provisions usually called general or standard provisions (Allgeineine Versicherungsbedingungen-hereafterabbreviated AVB), though
there are also some special clauses for individual risks called Sonderbedingungen. These provisions may be printed in the same document with
the Police, but need not be. While regulation in America is focused upon
the insurance policy itself, in Germany it is concerned mostly with the
AVB, the standard clauses used by the company and incorporated by
reference into the policy. Like statutes, these clauses are carefully drafted
and are seldom amended. Indeed, in many types of insurance the same
forms are used by all companies, being printed as separate brochures and
distributed widely. While a copy of the AVB is usually given to the
prospective policyholder before he signs the application, he is considered
to have subjected himself to them by his signature whether or not he has
received, read or understood them. Although in principle AVB are
parts of private contracts between the parties, in practice they are handled
and construed like statutes.
(1) Private law controls. Not all rules of private law statutes
dealing with the insurance contract are made for the benefit and protection of the policyholder or to correct abuses in business practice. On
the whole, statutory provisions in German, Austrian and Swiss law do
not curtail the freedom of the parties to make their own agreements;
most rules of general contract law as well as of the law of the insurance
contract (found in the VVG) apply only so far as the parties have not
otherwise agreed. They are ius dispositivum. But the position of weakness of the ordinary policyholder vis-A-vis the insurer, as well as the
other peculiarities of the insurance contract, together with the feeling
that administrative control over the AVB was not sufficient, led the
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legislature to make certain minimum rules compulsory. 5 ' Thus the VVG
contains a number of rules that are ists cogens, i.e., that may not be
altered by agreement (compulsory rules), or may be altered only to a
limited extent (semi-compulsory rules). Depending on the purposes to
be achieved, the strictness of the law varies. The Swiss and Austrian
lawmakers favored compulsory provisions more than the Germans.'57
A few provisions are deemed so important that they must be
complied with or the entire contract will be void. Thus, for instance, a
life insurance contract on the life of a person who is not a party is void
unless the third person whose life is insured has given his written
consent.'
Violation of other provisions leads only to the invalidity of a
particular clause, leaving the rest of the contract unaffected and in force.
The invalidated portion of the contract is governed entirely by statutory
rules, as the non-complying clause is disregarded for all purposes. That
approach is comparable to the United States' technique of reading required standard provisions into a policy if it does not conform to the
statutory requirements. Inconsistent agreements are declared invalid in
Such provisions are
some individual sections of the German law.'
absolutely compulsory, and inconsistent stipulations are void even if
they are advantageous to the policyholder. 6
Other rules are semi-compulsory and prohibit deviations unfavorable
to the policyholder, the insured, the purchaser of the insured property
or third persons in general, as the case may be. Inasmuch as semicompulsory clauses may not be used as a defense by the insurer,' 6' the
rights of the protected persons are determined by the statutory provisions
or by the agreement, whichever is more favorable. These provisions are
similar to the standard provisions in the American statutes that need
not be adopted in precise terms but may be replaced by language more
favorable to the insured. Swiss law has many such provisions. 2 Some
of these semi-compulsory provisions allow conflicting agreements in
156. BRuCK, op. cit. supra note 118, at 20.

157. The 1880 Regulativ permitted individual agreements to vary the approved
Allgeineine Versicherungsbedingungen without limitation. But the Verordming of 1896
(supra, p. 31) allowed only deviations in favor of the insured. It was silent as to the
legal consequences of noncompliance. The subject of nonforfeiture and cash surrender
values is now usually dealt with in the private law (i.e., self-executing) codes on the
insurance contract.
158. See, e.g., Swiss VVG § 159(2). For a detailed enumeration of all provisions
which are compulsory to any extent, see 1 BRUcK-M LLER, op. cit. supra note 148, at
67-68.

159. See, e.g., Swiss VVG §§ 8, 64(3), 81(3), 87, 89(1).

160. A list of such provisions is found in the Swiss VVG § 97.
161. See, e.g., VVG §§ 15a, 34a, 42, 68a, 72, l15a, 158a, 178.
162. Swiss VVG § 98.

LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL CONTROL

719

certain cases, if consent is given by the insurance department.'6 3
The statute seeks to avoid so far as possible the danger that compulsory statutory provisions may unduly impede sound development by
confining restriction to those types of insurance where it seems indispensable."' Thus ocean marine and reinsurance contracts are not
affected at all by the provisions of the VVG.'6 5 Elaborate but noncompulsory rules (ius dispositivum) for ocean marine insurance are contained in the Commercial Code (Haudelsgesetzbuch) but in practice
are almost completely replaced by the standard form of the Allgemeine
Deutsche Seeversicherungsbedingungen. Reinsurance also is largely free
from regulation.'
For transport insurance, credit and fidelity insurance,
insurance against the risk of loss from the compulsory redemption of
bonds for less than market value (Versicherung gegen Kursverlust) and
any kind of property insurance on an open policy (laufende Versicherung), the provisions of the VVG are made noncompulsory.'67 Swiss
law makes fewer distinctions among classes of insurance, exempting only
transport insurance from the semi-compulsory provisions. 6 The German
law also grants, partly to the Minister of Justice and partly to the
government, the authority, as yet unexercised, to exempt certain groups
of contracts from the compulsory parts of the statute.'6 9
In France, the same distinction between private and public law is
made as in Germany. While in its basic principles the French code is
patterned after the Swiss and German laws of 1908,"'0 there is an
important difference in the binding force of the provisions. The German
VVG adheres to the principle of freedom of contract; as a rule, its
provisions may be replaced by contradictory agreements, and relatively
few rules are compulsory. Contrariwise, the French law is compulsory
by principle and expressly forbids any modification of the various provisions, except for twenty-two sections which by their language offer
certain particular contract modifications to the parties.'' Strictly con163. Swiss VVG §§ 89(2), 189.
164. See BRUCK, op. cit. supra note 118, at 22-23.
165. Swiss VVG § 186.

166. There is only limited supervision of the financial affairs to secure the
soundness of the enterprises. See Verordnung fiber die Beaufsichtigung der inlindischen
privaten Riickversicherungsunternehmungen, Dec. 2, 1931, [1931] Reichgesetzblatt 1:696.
167. Swiss VVG § 187(1)-(2). These are lines of insurance where policyholders
are usually economically strong and technically experienced.
168. Swiss VVG § 98.
169. Swiss VG §§ 187(3), 188. The language of the code still refers to the
authorities having jurisdiction in 1908 (Kaiser, Reichsrat); adjustment to the new
constitution is effected by Article 129 of the Grundgesetz.

170. The law of the insurance contract is contained in the loi du 13 juillet 1930.
PICARD L-r BEssoN, op. cit. supra note 129, at 59.
171. Loi du 13 juillet 1930, art. 2.
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strued, the words would even prohibit modification for the benefit of
the policyholder. Most French authors agree, however, that the statute
should be construed in a sense that permits deviating contract stipulations
which are more favorable to the insured." 2 Nevertheless, insurers in
France are bound by compulsory private law rules much more than in
Germany or other European countries. The area left for the free determination of the parties or for negotiation between insurers and regulatory agency is comparatively small.
In Great Britain insurers generally are unrestrained in the drafting
of contract forms, except by the principles of law applied by the courts.
To this statement there are two notable exceptions. First, for industrial
life insurance, elaborate provisions are made in the Industrial Assurance
Act of 1923, granting nonforfeiture values and other minimum benefits.'
These provisions are cast in the form of self-executing rules of
law; the more important ones also must be literally inserted in the policy.
The statute permits the Industrial Assurance Commissioner to consent
to the policy containing statements setting forth sufficiently the substance
or effect of the statutory provisions." 4 The other exception is the law
of marine insurance, codified by special statute in 1906.'
The Marine
Insurance Act not only contains many self-executing substantive provisions similar to those of the German VVG, but it also establishes
certain other requirements for the form and contents of the marine
insurance policy." 6 An optional form of policy covering loss of ship
and goods, identical with the policy form used by Lloyd's insurers, is
printed in a schedule to the act, which further contains "Rules for
Construction" to be applied to the terms and expressions used in marine
insurance policies unless the context otherwise requires.'
The fact that the law of marine insurance is thus codified when
other branches are not may be explained by the great importance of
marine insurance to England and by the fact that a great number of
contracts with foreigners are subject to British law. From the very
beginning of insurance regulation, marine insurance has attracted the
attention of the government. 8
172. See PICARD ET BEssoN, op. cit. supra note 129, at 59-60; EREN WEIG, Op. cit.
supra note 124, at 18 n.1; SIcoT Er MARGEAT, PRECIS DE LA Loi suR LE CONTRAT
D'ASSURANCE 19 (4th ed. 1962).

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

1923, 13 & 14 GEO. 5, c. 8.
13 & 14 Geo. 5, c.8, § 21, and Third Schedule.
Marine Insurance Act, 1906, 6 Edw. 7, c. 41.
Marine Insurance Act, 1906, 6 Edw. 7, c. 41, §§ 22-31. See note 110 mepra.
Marine Insurance Act, 1906, 6 Edw. 7, c. 41, § 30, and First Schedule.

178. In the 18th and 19th centuries, requirements as to the contents of marine

contracts were set forth in statutes which on their face were tax measures. They were
accompanied by several standard forms of policies, though the use of other forms was not
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In the other types of insurance, the only check on a development
of policy forms adverse to the policyholders is provided by the courts
in the ordinary course of enforcing and interpreting insurance contracts.
A curb on the retention or introduction of terms too unfavorable to the
insured is also said to lie in the traditionally high standard of business
ethics in the British insurance business and in the competition which
exists between the companies organized in tariff offices on the one side
and the independent insurers and Lloyd's on the other."'
(2) Public law controls. Public law comprises those rules which
are concerned with the duties of the insurer or other persons towards the
public, without reference to the effect on the private law relationships
between the parties to the insurance contract. The most important public
law provision in Germany affecting the terms of the insurance contract
requires approval by the insurance department not only for the introduction of new AVB but also for change in existing forms."' 0
V.

JUDICIAL CONTROL OF INSURANCE CONTRACT TERMS IN EUROPE

As with the corresponding treatment of American judicial activity,
this section is intended only to provide a reasonably rounded picture-it
would be impracticable to provide an exhaustive analysis of this complex

subject within the framework of the present article. The analysis here
is based mainly on German law.
entirely prohibited. See the Acts, 35 Geo. 3, c. 63, § 5, 11-13 (1798) ; 30 & 31 Vict. c. 23,
§ 5, 7-8 (1867). For details of the historical development, see RAYNES, A HISTORY
OF BRITISH INSURANCE 41-75 (1948).
179. See BOHLINGER & MORRILL, INSURANCE SUPERVISION AND PRACTICES IN
ENGLAND 73-77 (1948) ; Kessler, Forces Shaping the Insurance Contract, in UNIVERSITY
or CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL CONFER NCE ON INSURANCE 3, 11-12 (Conference Series No.
14, Jan. 15, 1954). For psychological factors which may account for the success of the
English system, see MowB Y & BLANCHARD, INSURANCE 493 (5th ed. 1961). Regulation
in the Netherlands is similar to that in Great Britain, but the distinction between private
and public law is continental. There are virtually no public law provisions about
insurance and only relatively few special private law provisions contained in the Civil
and Commercial Codes, which were enacted in the first part of the 19th century.
Burgerlijk Wetboek, entered into force on October 1, 1838 (Besluit, April 10, 1838,
[1838] Staatsblad No. 12), is printed in DE NEDERLANDSCHE WETBOEKEN § 1811 (Fruin
ed. 1959), where insurance is listed among gambling contracts. WETBOEK VAN Koo"HANDEL §§ 246-308, 592-695 (1959). A revision now under way will make the Civil
Code deal more adequately with the insurance contract. See Schreiber, Die Niederliindische Versicherungswirtschaft, in 1959 VERSICHERUNGSWISSENSCErAFTLICHES ARCHIV
51, 52-53. Contract terms must be filed with the insurance regulatory agency for its
information, but are not subjected to control. Some extension of regulatory control
is contemplated, but without introducing new principles. No extension of control of the
insurance contract is contemplated. Wet tot regeling van het Levensverzekeringsbedrijf,
Dec. 22, 1922, [1922] Staatsblad No. 716; for details see Schreiber, supra at 51-54.
180. For the insurance department's distinction between "Allgemeine Versicherungsbedingungen" and "Besondere Versicherungsbedingungen," see 1908 VER6FFENTLICHUNGEN 111-14.
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The methodological differences between common law and civil law
in the decision of cases are fewer than prevailing doctrine in the two
systems would suggest. It is true, of course, that the European judge is
normally engaged in the interpretation of a statute and its application to
the facts of a case. But the sophisticated lawyer in the civil law system is
as aware as his counterpart in the United States of the creative role of
the judge, even though that role may indeed be less important than that
of the common-law judge, particularly the American judge.
In the civil law, public policy principles are enacted by statute much
more extensively than in the common law; in the latter they grow
gradually out of the decisions of cases. The ostensible duty of the civillaw judge is to apply the principles established by the legislature, but the
difference in result is not very great in ordinary cases. Though in the
common-law system the basic principles are the result of cases, they
develop over decades or even centuries, and the individual judge in the
ordinary course of his daily work has only to apply them, altering and
developing them only marginally. Furthermore, though stare decisis is
not an official doctrine of the continental system, the weight of a wellconsidered case may be very considerable indeed, and in the interpretation of policies it may be decisive and defeat the contradictory views
of policy-drafters.
For both statutory and contract interpretation in German law,
elaborate rules and principles have been developed through academic
discussion and the practice of the courts, in addition to those prescribed
by statute. The most important rules of construction in Germany are that
contract terms must be interpreted in order to give effect to the real
intentions of the parties rather than to the literal meaning of the language
used, and that in the interpretation of contracts both good faith and
general usage are factors that must be considered.18 1 In addition, the
nature of the contract and the goals sought by it are weighed heavily
in the process of interpretation.'
The search for the intention of the
parties is a method used in common with the Anglo-American system,
but express incorporation of good faith and general usage into the
process are departures from the ostensible common-law method. It
should be noted that what the common-law judge does covertly, his civil
law counterpart is authorized by statute to do overtly. In this respect
181. Bfirgerliches Gesetzbuch § 133: "Bei der Auslegung einer Willenserklfrung
ist der wirkliche Wille zu erforschen und nicht an dem buchstablichen Sinne des Ausdrucks zu haften." Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch § 157: "Vertrfge sind so auszulegen, wie
Treu und Glauben mit Ricksicht auf die Verkehrssitte es erfordern."
182.

For contract interpretation generally, see 2 ENNECCERU S-NiPPERD Y, Op. cit.

supra note 6, at 1246-65.
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the civil-law judge has more extensive authority than the common-law
judge.
In determining the extent of coverage of insurance contracts, the
fact that the contract is intended to provide security is thought to justify
the extension of coverage in doubtful cases, including restrictive interpretation of exclusionary clauses.'
In the common-law system the same
results would be reached in such a case, but would ordinarily be grounded
on the contra proferentem doctrine, which would also be applicable to
problems other than coverage. The civil-law formulation used here
would overtly interpret ambiguity in favor of broader coverage, and thus
would remain intact even if the state approves or dictates the terms;
that also might be an appropriate rule for the common law.8 4 But the
civil law judge may deny recovery where extension of coverage would be
inconsistent with actuarial science or insurance economics; the idea of
the "community of policyholders" is invoked to deny unjustified preferences to individual policyholders.'
In civil law theory, as in the common law, there is said to be no
place for interpretation of unambiguous language. This principle is
difficult to reconcile with others already stated. As with common-law
rules of interpretation, consistency can be achieved only by excessive
refinement of the rules. Despite the literal meaning rule, in practice
the civil-law judges, like common-law judges, often have created an
ambiguity in order to extend coverage for the purpose of treating the
policyholder fairly as determined by the bench. "
Categorization of the insurance policy as a contract of adhesion is
important for interpretation. Since AVB are not made for individual
contracts but for a multiplicity of contractual relationships, the true
intentions of the parties, particularly the policyholder, seem irrelevant.
Courts and academic writers agree that AVB and other contracts of
adhesion must be interpreted as statutes are interpreted, without reference to the personal views or situation of the litigant-policyholder.' 7
The rule contra proferentem is also used in continental jurisprudence. The German Reichsgericht has held that this rule may only
be used as a supplementary doctrine to reconcile an existing ambiguity,
183. 1 BRUCK-MOLLER, op. cit. supra note 148, at 72-75.

184. This suggestion is discussed p. 807 supra and p. 729 infra.

185. See note 183 supra.
186. See, e.g., a decision of the German Reichsgericht of Feb. 5, 1932, 135
Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen 136.

187. See PRAUSNITz, THE STANDARDIZATION OF COmERCiAL CONITRAcrS IN ENGLISH AND CONTINENTAL LAW (1937); RAISER, DAS RECHT DER ALLGEMEINEN
GEsCHAFTSBEDINGUNGEN (1936).
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when no other method leads to a solution,' 88 but lower courts have
frequently declared an ambiguity to exist in order to extend coverage
through use of the contra proferentem rule.
Not only can the German judge achieve justice through the interpretation of the contract, but he also has another powerful statutory
tool for the purpose. The Civil Code requires that obligations be
performed according to the standards of good faith.' There seems to be
an increasing tendency of German courts to use this provision as an indirect way to modify contractual stipulations they regard as unfair. A
recent decision of the Bundesgerichtshof demonstrates the potency of this
tool. In his proof of loss, a policyholder fraudulently misstated the value
of part of his property. Despite a clear provision in the AVB denying
any protection in that event, the court thought that such a forfeiture
would contravene the Civil Code principle; it held that he only lost the
portion of his claim which was applicable to the misrepresented prop19 0
erty.
Decisions of the courts have various effects on the content of the
contracts. Sometimes the insurer will revise its AVB to evade an unfavorable interpretation. This was the case with a clause requiring
repair as a prerequisite to recovery on marine (hull) insurance.'
On
the other hand the insurer may decide to acquiesce in the court's interpretion by not amending its policy. Finally, new legislation may be prompted
by court decisions. For example, the German courts developed a
restrictive interpretation of certain exclusion clauses (moral hazard
clauses) to provide that policyholders would only lose their claims under
them if they had acted negligently. This view was then incorporated
in the insurance contract code. 2
VI.

COMPARATIVE OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

The evolution of the standardized contract, according to one view of
the matter, is bringing a new regime of status and reversing the development described in Maine's celebrated aphorism about the progress of
society from status to contract.'
At any rate, whether or not it is
proper to describe the consequence of contracts of adhesion as the
188. Decision of Oct. 30, 1934, [1935] JuRIsTIscHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 1010.
189. Bfirgerliches Gesetzbuch § 242: "Der Schuldner istverpflichtet, die Leistung
so zu bewirken, -vie Treu and Glauben mit Rficksicht auf die Verkehrssitte es erfordern."
190. Decision of Nov. 28, 1963, [1964] VERSICHERUNGSRECHT 154-56.
191. SCHLEGELBERGER, SEEVERSICHERUNGSRECHT 186 (1960).
192. RAISER, op. cit. supra note 187, at 265-66.
193. Isaacs, The Standardizing of Contracts, 27 YALE LJ. 34 (1917). See also
Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43
COLUm. L. REv. 629 (1943).
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creation of a new relationship of status, widespread use of the contract
of adhesion is creating many difficult problems for the legal system.
Traditional views about freedom of contract are widely felt to
require considerable modification in the face of the disappearance from
the market of the kind of equality of bargaining power presupposed by
the dogma. When persons on one side of the contract are as a normal
matter quite unable to bargain effectively because of their ignorance and
their insignificance, as individual units (the ordinary insurance policyholder), then freedom of contract may no longer deserve acceptance as
a major assumption of the legal system, at least without serious qualification. The weaker party to the contract is thought to need and deserve
protection against overreaching. Although one can fairly assume that
a majority of professional insurance men regard themselves as trustees
of the welfare of their policyholders and do not deliberately overreach
or cheat, such honesty is by no means universal, and it is questionable
if the law can afford to abandon even a very small minority of policyholders to the tender mercies of avaricious men. This felt need for protection of some policyholders against overreaching has contributed substantially to the developments described in this paper. The point of view
described in this paragraph is a widely accepted one-prevailing in the
legislation of most countries. It is clearly rejected only in the United
Kingdom and the Netherlands.
On the other hand, it is too easy and would be quite erroneous to
assume that imposition of control over insurance policy terms is solely
a product of the need to prevent overreaching and protect the policyholder against the industry. In fact the industry, on the whole, seems to
have been favorably disposed toward uniform laws, which not only
control legitimate enterprise but also protect it from the unfair competition of the minority. For example, the production of uniformity for the
benefit of the companies seems to have been a more basic motive than the
protection of policyholders against overreaching in the development of
the earliest American standard fire policy laws. Careful sifting of the
materials examined for the production of this paper has disclosed no
fundamental objection of the insurance industry to compulsory imposition of contract terms. Indeed, there is considerable evidence that it was
welcomed. This is easier to understand when one recalls that the companies have been quite able to make their views felt in the process of
writing such terms. It is the policyholders who are unrepresented most
often, at least in any formal way. In this respect the German system
has some advantages over the American, for the German policyholders
are protected to some extent by institutionalized and regularized arrange-
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ments. Some are represented by well organized societies, though this is
more true of business insureds represented by their trade associations
than of ordinary citizens.
Especially in earlier days, the American companies had no reason to
regret state intervention. For example, an 1895 Missouri standard policy
statute provided that the companies were to prepare the policy-the
commissioner merely had to approve it and his approval would likely be
a rather formal matter.'
It will be recalled that the first New York
policy was prepared by the Board of Fire Underwriters. Even in the
continental systems under which the industry has exerted less pressure,
the industry has had its opportunity to participate, usually in a more
regular and institutionalized fashion than in the informal American
system. Therefore, it would be a serious error to think of policy regulation in either America or Europe as an arbitrary imposition of the public
will on private enterprise. There is more interaction than that.
It seems curious, at first, that the American statutes should have
developed in the direction of requiring insertion of provisions in the
policy, when it would have been easier simply to enact them as binding
rules of law (ius cogens). But a little reflection shows the justification.
Even in some of those instances where the rules of law have been
changed, it has appeared to the legislature worthwhile also to require insertion in the policy. Warranty statutes provide an illustration. The
justification is the purpose of informing the policyholder-of making his
rights as clear to him as the matter allows. This may be called the formal
aspect of the provision. Every statutory section that requires an insertion
in the policy has an important formal element, as well as its substantive
one. One may ask, then, why the German insurance contract law should
have so little emphasis on form. It is not because the Germans do not feel
it important to inform the policyholder, but because the compulsory
rules of law found in the VVG have a habit of finding their way into the
Allgemeine Versicherungsbedigugez, the German equivalent of our
policy terms. Normally AVB are delivered to policyholders, who may
read them though they are not likely to do so; that is, the process of
administrative supervision ensures that the formal needs are met. Both
systems feel the same need to inform the policyholder and succeed in
doing so to some extent by employing different techniques.
This leads to a related observation. It is noteworthy that the
German VVG has very few formal provisions. The French code, on the
194. Mo. Laws 1895, p. 194, § 1. The section was held to be an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power in Nalley v. Home Ins. Co., 250 Mo. 452, 157 S.W.

769 (1913).
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other hand, has a good many, though German and French laws are
otherwise quite similar. And it has been shown that not only do the
American statutes contain numerous purely formal provisions but that
in a certain sense most American statutes are formal. The difference
in the degree of formality may well be dependent partly on the effectiveness of the supervisory activity that was contemplated as the counterpart
of the legislative control. The German VAG preceded the contract
act (VVG) by seven years, and the drafters of the latter could rely on
the efficiency and orderliness of the German civil service to provide the
necessary formal element. On the other hand, the French contract
law preceded development of a regulatory agency with extensive powers
and thus had to supply the formal element.
For American law, finally, it must be said that much American
regulation has been ineffective despite its comprehensive character,
because of the small size of the states in which it characteristically operates and because of the haphazard way in which it has tended to develop.
Moreover, American statutes have developed in such an unplanned way
that one could hardly expect the rational decisions that were perhaps
made in the German and French cases. An interesting by-product of our
lack of system is the surprisingly great volume of statutory law affecting
the insurance contract-greater than in any continental country despite
the greater importance of the courts in the development in the United
States. The cause is the "case-law" nature of even our legislative
activity, i.e., the legislators respond only to specific problems, on the
whole, and the ultimate result is great complexity.
The lesser degree of system in the American development of insurance regulation has both advantages and disadvantages. One of its
advantages is that it adapts more rapidly to new or changed forms.
American legislatures respond more readily to new developments in a
field of this kind than do European ones, as they worry less about the
"elegance" of the statutes. The German VVG, for example, did not
mention sickness insurance in 1908 when the code was first enacted,
probably because that line of insurance was not important enough. Today when such insurance has assumed sizeable proportions, the German
lesislature still has not taken the trouble to deal with it, even though
the principles enacted for life insurance are analogous and would provide
a reasonable, simple and fairly effective solution. Instead the systemmaker, i.e., the academician, must fit this new form, as well as others,
into the existing system. The place of the text writer, the academician,
in the German legal system is of sufficient importance that new problems
are given fairly adequate treatment in successive editions of systematic
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treatises. Naturally the administrative agency plays a large role in this
adaptation, too. Group life and accident and sickness insurance as well
as credit life and accident and sickness insurance, all treated in recent
American statutes, remain unmentioned in the relevant German statutes,
though not for that reason undealt with by the law. Not only are general
provisions of the statutes applied, but in one way or another the administrator and academician decide which of the existing specific provisions are applicable to the new forms.
The degree of flexibility of statutes varies a great deal in response
to a number of variant factors. The constitutional difficulties with
delegation of legislative power have produced an unfortunate rigidity in
the American market by leading to the production of standard policies
which are hard to modify. Even after the constitutional difficulty has
disappeared, the technique remains. Probably the constitutional difficulty
has also contributed to the tendency to use complex standard provisions
laws. Over a period of time the resulting rigidity has produced a reaction, leading to suggestions to abandon the standard policy form in
fire insurance, and leading legislators to require compliance only "in
substance" and also to leave a loophole to escape the clauses through
the exercise of administrative discretion. Another factor affecting the
degree of rigidity of legislative prescription is the extent to which the
administrative control machinery is developed. The German VVG is one
of the most liberal of all systems on the continent; it was enacted in
contemplation of an existing effective administrative machine.
It is doubtful that significant differences can be detected among the
major states of the occidental world as to the relative importance of the
doctrine of freedom of contract. Generally it was felt to be of especial
importance about the turn of the century. It has tended gradually to lose
its force since then, though in Germany it perhaps reached its apex in
the Weimar Constitution of 1919, plunged to a low under the National
Socialist regime, and was reinstated in considerably muted form under
the Bonn Constitution.
The apparatus expressing the level of importance placed on freedom
of contract varies more, however. Traditionally in the United States,
the legislature interfered in contract terms only when important public
interests were at stake, but the relatively limited legislation that resulted
was couched in compulsory or semi-compulsory terms. Such a limited
legislative role in the freedom of contract area caused the courts to create
dispositive law through interpretation-to search for "implied terms."
As a result of the legislature's inactivity on particular matters, courts
created what one might call "quasi-compulsory" terms by going beyond
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the task of interpretation and distorting the meaning of a contract. In
European law, on the other hand, the legislature created dispositive
law at an early date and with it provided the necessary compulsory law,
leaving little room for the courts to intervene, even if they had not
already been substantially deterred by the lesser role they enjoy in the
continental system. However, by authorizing interpretation in accordance
with good faith and the intent of the parties, the statutes themselves
provide the continental court more freedom of action within the framework of the statutory rules than does the common law.
It is not easy to generalize about the justification for judicial intervention in policy terms. It is hard to doubt that in the American system,
at least, there is justification for some misconstruction of policy language
on general public policy grounds, though the deception-even selfdeception-seems an unfortunate way to intervene. On this Justice
Clark's strictures seem justified: intervention should be overt and not
covert. But it is also difficult to avoid the conclusion that judges tend to
intervene in complex matters about which they know very little. Unless
courts can become better informed on the technical aspects of insurance,
there ought to be more self-limitation in judicial intervention; the judges
should attempt more often to construe contracts in accordance with the
natural meaning of the language and should assume somewhat less
dogmatically than they now do that they and only they know what the
"minimum decencies" require.
On the other hand, there seems to be justification for the view that
the rule of construction contra proferentem should not be changed as a
result of statutory or administrative intervention in insurance contracts.
The likelihood that insurance industry representatives have participated
effectively in the preparation of legislation plus the fact that a liberal
construction (where there is genuine and not artificial ambiguity) is
best suited to make insurance perform its social role make a prima fade
case for a continuance of judicial liberality. The rule would then become
frankly what it now is covertly-a rule of interpretation against the
company. It bears repetition, however, that this is only justifiable for
real, not artificially created ambiguities. Nor is this suggestion made
dogmatically-the problem is not free from doubt and difficulty.
It is not easy to judge the comparative effectiveness of differing
techniques of control. Indeed, it is probable that most of the techniques
in all the systems have their uses, and the problem is only one of choosing
the technique best adopted to the particular need of the moment. Perhaps
it is hardest to justify the standard policy law, though even that had its
great merit as the solution of a particular constitutional difficulty that no
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longer plagues the legislator to the same extent. Its disadvantage is
obvious: the relative rigidity and backwardness of this product in this
section of the market, deprived as it is of the incentive to improvement
offered by free competition.
The standard provisions law is a better method for controlling
contract terms, if the legislature feels the necessity of involving itself
in the details of the matter. Through this device it is possible to leave
most of the contract free, or subject to the more flexible and constant
control of the insurance commissioner, while intervening decisively on
those matters deemed sufficiently important. The early standard provisions laws had their own source of rigidity in insistence on literal
compliance. The tendency more recently has been to use an "in substance"
approach as well as to change from fully compulsory to semi-compulsory
provisions. The "in substance" requirement permits flexibility of formulation and improvement in formulation, while semi-compulsory provisions
are undoubtedly more appropriate than fully compulsory ones to the
extent that such provisions are intended to protect the policyholder against
the company. On the other hand, fully compulsory provisions are better
suited for the imposition upon both parties of principles of public policy
that transcend the interest of the insured, such as the insurable interest
doctrine or a suicide exclusion clause. The necessary concomitant of a
more liberal and less rigid statutory regime, however, is an increase in
administrative discretion and in the amount of administrative participation in the control process. This seems also to be the direction of historical development.
If one compares techniques in the systems, he is struck by the
relative sharpness of the continental European distinctions as compared
to the American. So far does the distinction between public and private
law go, for example, that the issuance of an administrative Verordming
in Austria requiring companies to insert provisions in AVB met
criticism as an invasion of private law matters by a public law agency.
The assumption was that only legislative activity should be used to create
private law effects while the activity of an administrative agency should
have only public law consequences. But even in Europe the distinction
is far from clear, as is shown by the German provision authorizing the
department to order a change in AVB with effect even upon existing
contracts. There has been a strong tendency to limit activity under
this provision to serious emergencies-a reflection of contemporary
constitutional attitudes in the West German republic. The section also
trenches upon a public policy that has received vigorous expression in the
United States: the notion that existing contractual relationships should

LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL CONTROL

not be interfered with by ex post facto governmental activity, which
has received concrete expression in the contracts clause of the United
States Constitution.
The Austrian objections to the blurring of the distinction between
private and public law has its counterpart in the American emphasis on
separation of powers, reflected here in the constitutional inhibitions
against administrative formulation of standard policy terms. Though
the two ideas are not quite the same, they are related and have somewhat
the same effect.
Indeed, though one cannot press the point too far, a striking thing
about these disparate developments in systems that are technically quite
divergent is that when viewed in their totality they seem to accomplish
much the same purpose. In saying this, one must make an exception for
the regimes of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, which for
reasons deeply rooted in history and in the special circumstances of those
particular insurance markets have valued much more highly than any
other systems the common tradition of freedom of contract, and have
not permitted it to become overwhelmed by the demands for "protection
of the policyholder." With this general observation, the fuller demonstration of which must await the subsequent and related article, this
article must end.

